\documentclass[PP]{AEA}

\usepackage{booktabs}
\usepackage{tabularx}
\usepackage[font={sc,small},labelfont={sc}]{caption}
\captionsetup[table]{labelsep=none}


\usepackage{amsmath,array,graphicx}
\usepackage{tabularx}
\usepackage[usenames]{color}
\usepackage{setspace}


\newenvironment{Table}
   {\par\bigskip\noindent\minipage{\columnwidth}\centering}
   {\endminipage\par\bigskip}


\usepackage{natbib}


\defcitealias{BelmontReport}{Belmont Report, 1978}


\begin{document}


\title{The Ethics of Incentivizing the Uninformed. A Vignette Study}


\shortTitle{The Ethics of Incentivizing the Uninformed. }


\author{Sandro Ambuehl and Axel Ockenfels\thanks{Ambuehl: University of Toronto, UTSC and Rotman School of Management, 105 St George St, Toronto, ON M5S 3E6, Canada, (e-mail: sandro.ambuehl@utoronto.ca.) Ockenfels: University of Cologne, Department of Economics, Universit{\"a}tsstrasse 22a, 50923 Cologne, Germany (e-mail: ockenfels@uni-koeln.de). We are grateful to Fulya Ersoy, Annett John, Nico Lacetera, Matthew Mitchell, Luigi Zingales, as well as participants at the University of Toronto's economic theory workshop for helpful comments and suggestions. Ockenfels thanks the DFG research unit ``Design \& Behavior'' (FOR 1371) for financial support.}}\pubMonth{May}


\date{\today}


\pubYear{2017}


\pubVolume{107}


\pubIssue{5}


\maketitle


 In this paper, respondents to a vignette study predict that women with lower cognitive ability respond more to an increase in the incentive for egg donation, and deem this ethically problematic. They consider costly informational interventions a more ethical means of raising participation than spending equivalent resources as additional incentive, although they believe participants would prefer the latter.


\setstretch{1}


\parskip = 0pt


Economists often espouse incentives, since they can lead to desirable outcomes simply by enlarging the set of voluntary choices available. \citet{BeckerElias}, for instance, argue that allowing incentives for living organ donation would be a Pareto-improvement.\footnote{Such incentives are currently prohibited in all countries except Iran.} Ethicists, by contrast, are typically queasy about incentives, in particular as they apply to transactions like organ donation, medical trial participation, or surrogate motherhood. Our aim is to better understand the empirical nature of the constraints that ethical concerns place on markets \citep{Roth.repugnance, Ambuehletal.Repugnance, JMP}.


In a recent working paper \citep{Ambuehletal.ForTheyKnowNot} we show both theoretically and experimentally that when the acquisition and processing of information about a transaction is costly, individuals with higher marginal costs of information often respond more to a given increase in the incentive. Hence as incentives rise, people who find it more difficult to become well-informed about the transaction comprise an increasing fraction of participants. They elect to participate based on a less complete understanding of the consequences of their choice (see Section \ref{behaviorPredictions} for intuition).

Incentives may thus be at odds with \emph{informed consent}. This fundamental principle of bioethics maintains that a decision is ethically sound if it is made not only voluntarily but also in light of all relevant information, properly comprehended \citepalias{BelmontReport}.


Will people express reservations about incentives if they lead to the selection effects we document in our working paper? On the one hand, such behavior is consistent with Bayesian rationality. Hence, within a standard welfare economics framework, it does not give rise to concern. On the other hand, a mechanism that causes people to participate based on an inferior understanding of the transaction is in uncomfortable company with the principle of informed consent, no matter whether rational or not.


We examine this question using a vignette study. Respondents judge the ethics of incentives for human egg donation when potential participants differ in cognitive ability, and of various policies to increase the supply of egg donors. We design the survey with two goals in mind. First, we demonstrate that concerns about incentivizing people who differ in cognitive ability are distinct from concerns with incentivizing the poor. This distinction is relevant for a policymaker aiming for political feasibility. If, empirically, ethical concerns center around a lack of comprehension about the transaction, then the moral acceptance of an incentive system can be improved by interventions such as stringent informed consent requirements. By contrast, informational interventions will not ease concerns that primarily relate to economic inequality. Second, we aim to determine whether concerns about incentives for people with heterogeneous ability are related to the mechanisms we document in our working paper. We test a necessary condition: How do respondents think incentives affect the selection of participants, and how do they think information acquisition responds depending on the ability of the incentivized?  The theoretically predicted mechanisms are a plausible reason for concerns with incentives only if respondents anticipate them.


\section{Vignette}


Our vignette briefly describes the transaction of paid egg donation and highlights the need for information acquisition that arises from its complexity.
 We introduce two women thinking about donating eggs in exchange for \$8,000, and explicitly describe their cognitive ability and level of education, as well as their financial situation.  For each respondent, the two women vary along one of the dimensions and are equal along the other, yielding the four treatments (ability varies, rich), (ability varies, poor), (high ability, finances vary), and (low ability, finances vary).\footnote{We randomized the order of presentation and the assignment of names to women on the individual level.}  To mute the association between ability and income, respondents consider financial resources that vary due an inheritance of \$500,000, rather than due to differential wage rates.


We conducted the survey in Fall 2016 on Amazon Mechanical Turk with a total of 502 U.S.-based respondents. We paid \$5 for participation, and attrition was independent of treatment (see Online Appendix for details and survey).


\section{Results}


\subsection{Ethical Judgments}


How do respondents ethically judge a rise in the incentive if it leads to a disproportionate increase in the participation of low-ability women? We elicited respondents' judgment of an increase in the incentive by \$4,000, and asked them to assume that the additional donors drawn by the higher incentive are mostly low-ability women. A striking 59.2\% of our respondents think that the clinic should not raise the incentive, compared to 10.8\% who think the opposite, and 30.0\% who are indifferent, as panel A of Table \ref{ethics} shows. In stark contrast, many fewer respondents disapprove of raising the incentive when asked to assume that it leads to negative selection regarding financial means. In this case, only 32.1\% think the clinic should \emph{not} raise the incentive, whereas 21.0\% think it should, and 46.8\% are indifferent. Hence, respondents are concerned about incentivizing those who might not easily understand what they sign up for, and this is not merely an implication of concerns with incentivizing the poor.


Both of these results are reflected in the answers to two additional questions. First, we separately elicited respondents' judgments about who should be incentivized if a single additional donor is needed. On the one hand, 28.4\% think it is more ethically sound to incentivize the high-ability woman, 3.2\% would incentivize the low-ability woman, and the remaining 68.4\% are indifferent, as panel B shows. On the other hand, respondents feel less strongly, and less unanimously, about targeting women depending on financial resources. 86.1\% percent are indifferent, and those who are not fall about equally on either side.


\begin{Table}
\captionof{table}{Ethical Judgments. \label{ethics}}
\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}\toprule
\emph{A. Raise incentive?} & Do not & Do & Indiff.\\
\cmidrule(r){2-4}
\hspace{0.0cm}Selection: ability&	59.2&10.8&30.0\\
\hspace{0.0cm}Selection: income&	32.1&21.0&46.8\medskip \\
\emph{B. Target whom?} & Low & High & Indiff.  \\
\cmidrule(r){2-4}
\hspace{0.0cm}Ability& 3.2&28.4& $68.4$ \\
\hspace{0.0cm}Income&6.7&7.1& $86.1$\medskip \\
\emph{C}. \emph{Inc. unethical?}& Low & High & Difference\\
\cmidrule(r){2 - 4}
Ability &15.6 &4.8 &-10.8  \\


Income &10.7 &8.3 &-2.4 \\ \bottomrule

\end{tabular}
\end{footnotesize}
\begin{tablenotes}
Panels A and B: \% respondents selecting into each column. Panel C shows the percentage of respondents considering incentivizing the respective woman unethical. All panels only use the respondents for whom the respective attribute was varied and average over the other attribute.
\end{tablenotes}
\end{Table}

Second, we asked about the extent to which respondents consider an \$8,000 incentive for egg donation ethical. As panel C shows, 15.6\%  think that incentivizing low-ability women is unethical, but only 4.8\% think this way about incentivizing high-ability women, a difference of 10.8 percentage points ($p<0.01$, averaged over financial resources). Varying financial resources by half a million dollars, by contrast, changes the fraction of respondents who consider the incentive unethical only by a statistically insignificant 2.4 percentage points (averaged over ability).\footnote{There is an interesting discrepancy between the large fraction of respondents who disapprove of a rise in the incentive, and the small fraction who consider the original incentive unethical. Many respondents seem to subscribe to the view that once somebody has declined an offer, one should not attempt to `bribe' them into changing their mind \citep{GrantAPSR}.}


\subsection{Policy Judgments}


How can one increase the number of participants in a transaction like egg donation in a way that respondents will view as ethically sound? \citet{GrantAPSR} suggests that persuasion ``on the basis of reason alone might be considered \emph{the} morally exemplary form of power''.


To test this intuition, we asked respondents to explicitly compare two policies, assuming that they both raise the expected number of participants by the same amount, and generate an additional \$4,000 in expenses per donor. The first policy  simply increases the incentive payment. The second policy  leaves the incentive payment unchanged, but uses the funds to provide information such as meetings with previous donors, and psychological counseling. Panel A of Table \ref{policy} shows that 67.7\% of the respondents feel that the information policy is more ethical than the higher incentive. In stark contrast, only 10.4\% predict that potential donors would prefer the information policy; 78.9\% predict donors would prefer the higher incentive.


These results suggest a demand for policies to ensure that participants in a transaction like egg donation are sufficiently well-informed. Hence, we asked respondents to assess  two such interventions. The first requires potential egg donors to attend mandatory information sessions and to interview five previous donors. As panel B shows, 62.4\% of respondents support  this policy; only 24.3\% oppose it. Support recedes only mildly (to 56.4\%) for a more heavy-handed intervention that additionally requires potential donors to pass a thorough exam about the possible consequences of egg donation. (Opposition rises to 28.3\%.)


\begin{Table}
\captionof{table}{Policy Judgments. \label{policy}}
\begin{footnotesize}
	\begin{tabular}{l}\toprule
	\begin{tabular}{lccc}
	\emph{A. Which policy?} & Info. & {Pay} & Neither\\
	\cmidrule(r){2-4}
	\hspace{0.0cm}More ethical 	&67.7&16.7&15.5\\
	\hspace{0.0cm}Donors prefer	&10.4&78.9&10.8 \medskip\\
	\emph{B. Law} & Oppose & {Support} & Neither \\
	\cmidrule(r){2-4}
	\hspace{0.0cm}Mandatory info. &	24.3&62.4&13.3\\
	\hspace{0.0cm}Exam &		28.3&56.4&15.3 \medskip \\
\end{tabular}\\
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
	\emph{C. Indiv. consistency} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Choice in best interest}  \\
	& Participate & Abstain \\
	\cmidrule(r){2-3}
	{Support for}\\
	\hspace{0.2cm}Mandatory information & -0.095*&0.020\\
	  &(0.049) & (0.052) \\
	\hspace{0.2cm}Mand. info. and exam & -0.081& 0.040\\
	 &(0.053) & (0.056)  \\
	Information more ethical&-0.100**&-0.022\\
	\hspace{0.2cm}  than incentive  &(0.048) & (0.050) \\
\end{tabular}\\
\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{footnotesize}
\begin{tablenotes}
Panels A and B show the fraction respondents selecting into each column, using those for whom the respective attribute was varied and averaging over the other attribute. Panel C shows how participants' responses depend on their beliefs about women's choices. Jointly estimated using SUR on all respondents.
\end{tablenotes}
\end{Table}


Respondents' attitudes are consistent, on the individual level, with their predictions of behavior. We elicited, for each woman and for each participation decision she could have made, how likely the respondent thought that her decision was in her own best interest, given the information she had acquired. As the first column of panel C shows, the less likely a respondent thinks a woman's  decision to participate is in her own best interest, the more likely they support mandatory information sessions, and the more likely they consider increasing participation through informational interventions ethically superior to higher incentives.\footnote{This result refutes the alternative hypothesis that respondents' reservations about incentivizing low-ability egg donors primarily concern the potential offspring.}

The second column shows that whether a woman's decision to abstain is deemed in her best interest has no predictive power; only judgments about the decision to participate do. Respondents' policy judgments depend on beliefs about decisions that may cause a woman to be \emph{ex post} worse off than before the transaction, but not about those that may cause her to forgo a potential benefit.


\subsection{Predictions of Behavior}\label{behaviorPredictions}


To test whether moral concerns are plausibly related to the selection effects described in \cite{Ambuehletal.ForTheyKnowNot}, respondents predicted the behavioral effects of incentives.   They did so before we elicited ethical judgments.


\begin{Table}
\captionof{table}{Predicted Behavior \label{predictions}}
\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}\toprule
\emph{A. $\Delta P$(ask} & Low & High & Difference  \\
\emph{another donor)}& ability & ability &\\
\cmidrule(r){2 - 4}
First donor \\
\hspace{0.2cm}encouraging &-0.55***&-0.09*&0.46***\\
 & (0.05) & (0.05) & (0.07)  \\
\hspace{0.2cm}discouraging &0.37***&0.50***&0.13*\\
 & (0.05) & (0.05) & (0.07)  \medskip \\


\emph{B. Pred. selection} & Low & High & None  \\
\cmidrule(r){2-4}
\hspace{0.0cm}Ability&64.0&18.4&17.6\\
\hspace{0.0cm}Income&75.8&19.0&5.2 \medskip\\
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\emph{C. Indiv. consistency}& \multicolumn{2}{c}{$\partial_{\mathrm{ability}} \partial_{\mathrm{incentive}}P$(find 2\textsuperscript{nd})} \\ & \multicolumn{2}{c}{  after 1\textsuperscript{st} donor was}\\
& encouraging & discouraging \\
\cmidrule(r){2-3}
Selection effect of  &-0.129**&0.048\\
\hspace{0.2cm} incentive on ability &(0.053) & (0.047)  \\
 \bottomrule
\end{tabular}


\end{footnotesize}
\begin{tablenotes}
Panel A jointly estimated using seemingly unrelated regression. Dependent variable coded as 1 = more likely, 0 = just as likely, -1 = less likely. The difference in differences of 0.33 is statistically significant ($p<0.01$).  Panel B shows the fraction of respondents selecting into each column. Panel C shows the individual-level relation between predicted effects on information acquisition and predicted selection effects. Panels B and C only use respondents for whom the respective attribute was varied and average over the other attribute.
\end{tablenotes}
\end{Table}


We presented the following scenario. A woman interested in donating eggs in exchange for \$8,000 has informed herself by talking to a previous donor. That donor has encouraged participation. The woman considers searching for one more donor to interview, but she is not quite sure whether it is worth the effort. Now, she learns that the compensation for egg donors has increased to \$12,000. How will this change the likelihood that she contacts an additional donor? And how will this effect differ if the previous donor had instead discouraged participation? For each of the women, each respondent saw both these questions.


Panel A of Table \ref{predictions} shows the results. Confirming the theoretical and experimental result in \citet{JMP}, respondents predict that women who have talked to a discouraging donor will become more likely to contact another donor as the incentive rises. Indeed, if the opportunity cost of non-participation rises by \$4,000, a Bayesian should exert more effort to ensure that the decision to abstain is not a mistake. At the same time, respondents predict women who have met an encouraging donor will become less eager to obtain a second opinion as the incentive rises. This is also consistent with rationality. The additional incentive provides partial insurance against \emph{ex post} undesirable outcomes, causing a Bayesian to reduce the acquisition of costly information that may prevent \emph{ex post}-mistaken participation.


Most crucially, respondents believe that incentives affect the information acquisition of low-ability women more strongly.  Specifically, they predict that after receiving encouraging information, the higher incentive significantly deflates the propensity of low ability women to contact another donor, but barely affects high ability women. The effect of ability is significantly smaller if the initial information was discouraging.\footnote{Similarly, respondents predict that the information acquisition of women with lower financial resources reacts more strongly to an increase in the incentive.} Such information acquisition behavior implies that low ability women will respond more strongly to an increase in the incentive, and will therefore be selected disproportionately.

Indeed, respondents anticipate these selection effects. We asked whether women who would participate for \$12,000 but not for \$8,000 are more frequently high or low ability women. Panel B shows that a 64\%-majority predict that the marginal participant would more frequently be a low ability woman, whereas 18.4\% predict the opposite, and the remainder predict no selection effects.


Strikingly, respondents' predictions about information acquisition  relate to those about selection on the individual level. As Panel C shows, respondents predict stronger selection effects if they have predicted a stronger effect of cognitive ability on the response of information acquisition to a higher incentive.\footnote{For all of these variables, respondents indicated not only the sign but also the strength of the effect.}

Hence, moral concerns about incentives are plausibly related to the selection effects they exert, as documented in \citet{Ambuehletal.ForTheyKnowNot}.


\section{Conclusion}


Informed consent requires adequate information and comprehension.  Our vignette study considers a situation in which this requirement is in conflict with libertarian principles. It is motivated by the results in \citet{Ambuehletal.ForTheyKnowNot} who show that  individuals with higher marginal costs of information processing often respond disproportionately to a rise in the incentive, and decide to participate based on an inferior understanding of the consequences of their choice. Respondents to our survey have qualms about incentivizing people for whom information processing is more difficult. These concerns directly relate to the ability to understand the transaction, and are not simply a side-effect of concerns with incentivizing the poor.  Respondents express a pronounced preference for policies that increase adherence to the principle of informed consent, even if they restrict voluntary choice.


Respondents correctly predict how ability changes the effect of incentives on information search, and how incentives change the selection of participants. These predictions, and  the individual-level consistency between the two, show that moral concerns with incentives are plausibly related to the mechanism documented in \citet{Ambuehletal.ForTheyKnowNot}.


Designers of incentive systems for transactions such as organ donation may  benefit from taking these concerns into account. Our results suggest that policies will be considered ethically sound only if they ensure that participants have a thorough understanding of the possible consequences of their choice. This is particularly important in situations where economic incentives may lead to a higher fraction of participants for whom obtaining and appropriately comprehending information is more difficult. Potential applications include all transactions in which salient upsides are pitted against potentially complex downsides that demand thorough but costly information acquisition. Examples include human research participation, surrogate motherhood, and may extend to personal finance decisions.


\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{FadenBeauchamp} Faden, Ruth R; Beauchamp, Tom L. A history; theory of informed consent. Oxford University Press. 1986.
\bibitem{GrantAPSR} Grant, Ruth W. Ethics; incentives: a political approach. \textit{American Political Science Review}. Cambridge Univ Press. vol. 100. no. 1. pp. 29--39. 2006.
\bibitem{Ambuehletal.ForTheyKnowNot} Sandro Ambuehl; Axel Ockenfels; Colin Stewart. For They Know Not What They Do. Incentives with Costly Information Acquisition.. \textit{unpublished}. 2017.
\bibitem{Woloshinetal.} Woloshin, Steven; Schwartz, Lisa M; Moncur, Megan; Gabriel, Sherine; Tosteson, Anna NA. Assessing values for health: numeracy matters. \textit{Medical Decision Making}. Sage Publications. vol. 21. no. 5. pp. 382--390. 2001.
\bibitem{ZikmundFisheretal.} Zikmund-Fisher, Brian J; Smith, Dylan M; Ubel, Peter A; Fagerlin, Angela. Validation of the Subjective Numeracy Scale: effects of low numeracy on comprehension of risk communications; utility elicitations. \textit{Medical Decision Making}. Sage Publications. 2007.
\bibitem{Reynaetal.Review} Reyna, Valerie F; Nelson, Wendy L; Han, Paul K; Dieckmann, Nathan F. How numeracy influences risk comprehension; medical decision making.. \textit{Psychological bulletin}. American Psychological Association. vol. 135. no. 6. pp. 943. 2009.
\bibitem{Sheridanetal.2003} Sheridan, Stacey L; Pignone, Michael P; Lewis, Carmen L. A randomized comparison of patients' understanding of number needed to treat; other common risk reduction formats. \textit{Journal of General Internal Medicine}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 18. no. 11. pp. 884--892. 2003.
\bibitem{JMP} Sandro Ambuehl. An Offer You Can't Refuse? Incentives Change What We Believe. \textit{CESifo working paper}. 2017.
\bibitem{BenabouTirole2011} B{\'e}nabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean. Identity, morals,; taboos: Beliefs as assets. \textit{The Quarterly Journal of Economics}. Oxford University Press. vol. 126. no. 2. pp. 805--855. 2011.
\bibitem{BenabouTiroleJEP} B{\'e}nabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean. Mindful Economics: The Production, Consumption,; Value of Beliefs. \textit{The Journal of Economic Perspectives}. American Economic Association. vol. 30. no. 3. pp. 141--164. 2016.
\bibitem{BenabouLaffontLecture} B{\'e}nabou, Roland. The Economics of Motivated Beliefs. \textit{Revue d'{\'e}conomie politique}. Dalloz. vol. 125. no. 5. pp. 665--685. 2015.
\bibitem{BenabouTirole2006MotivationCrowding} B{\'e}nabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean. Incentives; prosocial behavior. \textit{The American Economic Review}. American Economic Association. vol. 96. no. 5. pp. 1652--1678. 2006.
\bibitem{CheMierendorff} Yeon-Koo Che; Konrad Mierendorff. Optimal Sequential Decision with Limited Attention. \textit{unpublished manuscript}. 2016.
\bibitem{Farley} Farley, Melissa. Prostitution, Liberalism,; Slavery. \textit{Logos: A Journal of Modern Society \& Culture}. vol. 46. no. 3. 2013.
\bibitem{Danna} Daniela Danna. Report on prostitution laws in the European Union. \textit{unpublished manuscript}. 2014.
\bibitem{Nussbaum.Objectification} Nussbaum, Martha C. Objectification. \textit{Philosophy \& Public Affairs}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 24. no. 4. pp. 249--291. 1995.
\bibitem{Thiessenetal.} Thiessen, C; Kim, YA; Formica, R; Bia, M; Kulkarni, S. Written informed consent for living kidney donors: practices; compliance with CMS; OPTN requirements. \textit{American Journal of Transplantation}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 13. no. 10. pp. 2713--2721. 2013.
\bibitem{livingdonor101} livingdonor101.com. Living Donor Informed Consent. 2013.
\bibitem{DittoLopez} Ditto, Peter H; Lopez, David F. Motivated skepticism: Use of differential decision criteria for preferred; nonpreferred conclusions. \textit{Journal of Personality; Social Psychology}. American Psychological Association. vol. 63. no. 4. pp. 568. 1992.
\bibitem{EpleyGilovich} Epley, Nicholas; Gilovich, Thomas. The Mechanics of Motivated Reasoning. \textit{Journal of Economic Perspectives}. American Economic Association. vol. 30. no. 3. pp. 133--40. 2016.
\bibitem{chanceetal.2} Chance, Zoe; Gino, Francesca; Norton, Michael I; Ariely, Dan. The slow decay; quick revival of self-deception. \textit{Frontiers in psychology}. Frontiers Media SA. vol. 6. no. 1075. 2015.
\bibitem{chanceetal.1} Chance, Zo{\"e}; Norton, Michael I; Gino, Francesca; Ariely, Dan. Temporal view of the costs; benefits of self-deception. \textit{Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences}. National Acad Sciences. vol. 108. pp. 15655--15659. 2011.
\bibitem{GinoNortonWeber} Gino, Francesca; Norton, Michael I; Weber, Roberto A. Motivated Bayesians: Feeling Moral While Acting Egoistically. \textit{Journal of Economic Perspectives}. American Economic Association. vol. 30. no. 3. pp. 189--212. 2016.
\bibitem{DohertyThistle} Doherty, Neil A; Thistle, Paul D. Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets. \textit{Journal of Public Economics}. Elsevier. vol. 63. no. 1. pp. 83--102. 1996.
\bibitem{Melzeretal.} Linnainmaa, Juhani T; Melzer, Brian T; Previtero, Alessandro. The Misguided Beliefs of Financial Advisors. \textit{Unpublished manuscript}. 2016.
\bibitem{Wazana} Wazana, Ashley. Physicians; the pharmaceutical industry: is a gift ever just a gift?. \textit{Journal of the American Medical Association}. American Medical Association. vol. 283. no. 3. pp. 373--380. 2000.
\bibitem{Morganetal.PharmaGifts} Morgan, MA; Dana, Jason; Loewenstein, George; Zinberg, S; Schulkin, J. Interactions of doctors with the pharmaceutical industry. \textit{Journal of Medical Ethics}. BMJ Publishing Group Ltd; Institute of Medical Ethics. vol. 32. no. 10. pp. 559--563. 2006.
\bibitem{Campbelletal.PharmaGifts} Campbell, Eric G; Gruen, Russell L; Mountford, James; Miller, Lawrence G; Cleary, Paul D; Blumenthal, David. A national survey of physician--industry relationships. \textit{New England Journal of Medicine}. Mass Medical Soc. vol. 356. no. 17. pp. 1742--1750. 2007.
\bibitem{BazermanLoewensteinMoore} Bazerman, Max H; Loewenstein, George; Moore, Don A. Why good accountants do bad audits. \textit{Harvard business review}. vol. 80. no. 11. pp. 96--103. 2002.
\bibitem{AndersonEthics} Anderson, Elizabeth. Value in ethics; economics. Harvard University Press. 1995.
\bibitem{SenDeweyLectures} Sen, Amartya. Well-being, agency; freedom: the Dewey lectures 1984. \textit{The journal of philosophy}. JSTOR. vol. 82. no. 4. pp. 169--221. 1985.
\bibitem{SenOUP} Sen, Amaryta. On ethics; economics. \textit{OUP Catalogue}. Oxford University Press. 1999.
\bibitem{ExleyJMP} Exley, Christine L. Excusing selfishness in charitable giving: The role of risk. \textit{The Review of Economic Studies}. Oxford University Press. pp. rdv051. 2015.
\bibitem{HaisleyWeber} Haisley, Emily C; Weber, Roberto A. Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior. \textit{Games; Economic Behavior}. Elsevier. vol. 68. no. 2. pp. 614--625. 2010.
\bibitem{boneMarrow} Boo, Michael; van Walraven, Suzanna M; Chapman, Jeremy; Lindberg, Brian; Schmidt, Alexander H; Shaw, Bronwen E; Switzer, Galen E; Yang, Edward; Egeland, Torstein; World Marrow Donor Association. Remuneration of hematopoietic stem cell donors: principles; perspective of the World Marrow Donor Association. \textit{Blood}. Am Soc Hematology. vol. 117. no. 1. pp. 21--25. 2011.
\bibitem{HossainOkui} Hossain, Tanjim; Okui, Ryo. The binarized scoring rule. \textit{The Review of Economic Studies}. Oxford University Press. vol. 80. no. 3. pp. 984--1001. 2013.
\bibitem{Greene.MLfixedEffects} Greene, William. The behaviour of the maximum likelihood estimator of limited dependent variable models in the presence of fixed effects. \textit{The Econometrics Journal}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 7. no. 1. pp. 98--119. 2004.
\bibitem{KamenicaContextualInference} Kamenica, Emir. Contextual inference in markets: On the informational content of product lines. \textit{The American Economic Review}. American Economic Association. vol. 98. no. 5. pp. 2127--2149. 2008.
\bibitem{DongKaiser.panelDoubleHurdle} Dong, Diansheng; Kaiser, Harry M. Studying household purchasing; nonpurchasing behaviour for a frequently consumed commodity: two models. \textit{Applied Economics}. Taylor \&amp; Francis. vol. 40. no. 15. pp. 1941--1951. 2008.
\bibitem{Dongetal.PanelDoubleHurdle} Dong, Diansheng; Chung, Chanjin; Kaiser, Harry M. Modelling milk purchasing behaviour with a panel data double-hurdle model. \textit{Applied Economics}. Taylor \& Francis. vol. 36. no. 8. pp. 769--779. 2004.
\bibitem{Rosato} Rosato, Antonio. Selling Substitute Goods to Loss-Averse Consumers: Limited Availability, Bargains; Rip-offs. \textit{Unpublished manuscript}. 2013.
\bibitem{ZinmanZitzewitz} Zinman, Jonathan; Zitzewitz, Eric. Wintertime for Deceptive Advertising?. \textit{American Economic Journal: Applied Economics}. American Economic Association. vol. 8. no. 1. pp. 177--192. 2016.
\bibitem{Wilkieetal.} Wilkie, William L; Mela, Carl F; Gundlach, Gregory T. Does `bait; switch' really benefit consumers?. \textit{Marketing Science}. INFORMS. vol. 17. no. 3. pp. 273--282. 1998.
\bibitem{HessGerstner} Hess, James D; Gerstner, Eitan. Yes,`bait; switch' really benefits consumers. \textit{Marketing Science}. INFORMS. vol. 17. no. 3. pp. 283--289. 1998.
\bibitem{GerstnerHess} Gerstner, Eitan; Hess, James D. Can bait; switch benefit consumers?. \textit{Marketing Science}. INFORMS. vol. 9. no. 2. pp. 114--124. 1990.
\bibitem{MitchellMoro} Mitchell, Matthew F; Moro, Andrea. Persistent distortionary policies with asymmetric information. \textit{The American Economic Review}. JSTOR. vol. 96. no. 1. pp. 387--393. 2006.
\bibitem{EggDonorSettlement} Kelly Knaub. Egg Donors Get Pay Limits Axed With Antitrust Settlement. \textit{Law360}. 2016.
\bibitem{HoffmanBurks} Mitchell Hoffman; Stephen V. Burks. Training Contracts, Worker Overconfidence,; the Return from Firm-Sponsored General Training. \textit{Unpublished manuscript}. 2015.
\bibitem{Lazear.BaitAndSwitch} Lazear, Edward P. Bait; switch. \textit{Journal of Political Economy}. JSTOR. vol. 103. no. 4. pp. 813--830. 1995.
\bibitem{Suen.SelfPerpetuation} Suen, Wing. The Self-Perpetuation of Biased Beliefs. \textit{The Economic Journal}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 114. no. 495. pp. 377--396. 2004.
\bibitem{Bernheimetal.401k} B. Douglas Bernheim; Andrei Fradkin; Igor Popov. The Welfare Economics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 105. no. 9. pp. 2798-2837. 2015.
\bibitem{CaplinAnnualReviews} Andrew Caplin. Measuring; Modeling Attention. \textit{Annual Reviews of Economics}. forthcoming.
\bibitem{KoszegiRabinWelfare} Koszegi, Botond; Rabin, Matthew. Revealed mistakes; revealed preferences. \textit{The foundations of positive; normative economics: a handbook}. Oxford University Press New York. pp. 193--209. 2008.
\bibitem{Ambuehletal.FinEd} Ambuehl, Sandro; Bernheim, B Douglas; Lusardi, Annamaria. Financial Education, Financial Competence,; Consumer Welfare. \textit{NBER working paper 20618}. 2014.
\bibitem{BenoitDubra} Beno{\^\i}t, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan. Apparent overconfidence. \textit{Econometrica}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 79. no. 5. pp. 1591--1625. 2011.
\bibitem{HuckSzechWenner} Steffen Huck; Nora Szech; Lukas Wenner. More Effort With Less Pay - On Information Avoidance, Belief Design; Performance. \textit{unpublished manuscript, London Business School}. 2015.
\bibitem{Blackwell} Blackwell, David. Equivalent comparisons of experiments. \textit{The Annals of Mathematical Statistics}. Institute of Mathematical Statistics. vol. 24. no. 2. pp. 265--272. 1953.
\bibitem{Rosenberg1} Tina Rosenberg. Need a Kidney? Not Iranian? You'll Wait.. 2015.
\bibitem{Havocscope} Havocscope. Organ Trafficking Prices; Kidney Transplant Sales. 2015.
\bibitem{Epstein} Richard Epstein. The Economics of Organ Donations: EconTalk Transcript. 2006.
\bibitem{FriedmanSavage} Friedman, Milton; Savage, Leonard J. The utility analysis of choices involving risk. \textit{Journal of Political Economy}. JSTOR. vol. 56. no. 4. pp. 279--304. 1948.
\bibitem{Eggsploitation} Center for Bioethics; Culture. Eggsploitation. 2011.
\bibitem{Masseyetal.Regret} Massey, EK; Kranenburg, LW; Zuidema, WC; Hak, G; Erdman, RAM; Hilhorst, Medard; Ijzermans, JNM; Busschbach, JJ; Weimar, Willem. Encouraging psychological outcomes after altruistic donation to a stranger. \textit{American Journal of Transplantation}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 10. no. 6. pp. 1445--1452. 2010.
\bibitem{CaplinDean.AER15} Andrew Caplin; Mark Dean. Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention,; Costly Information Acquisition. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 105. no. 7. pp. 2183-2203. 2015.
\bibitem{nytEggs} Tamar Lewin. Egg Donors Challenge Pay Rates, Saying They Shortchange Women. \textit{New York Times}. 2015.
\bibitem{BeckerBlog} Gary S. Becker. Should the Purchase; Sale of Organs for Transplant Surgery be Permitted? BECKER. 2006.
\bibitem{diTellaetal.} Rafael DiTella; Ricardo Perez-Truglia; Andres Babino; Mariano Sigman. Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 105. no. 11. pp. 3416-3442. 2015.
\bibitem{Heldetal.} P.J. Held; F. McCormick; A. Ojo; J.P. Roberts. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Government Compensation of Kidney Donors. \textit{American Journal of Transplantation}. vol. 16. no. 3. pp. 877--885. 2016.
\bibitem{tseZhang} Tse, Yiu Kuen; Zhang, Xibin. A Monte Carlo investigation of some tests for stochastic dominance. \textit{Journal of Statistical Computation; Simulation}. Taylor \&amp; Francis. vol. 74. no. 5. pp. 361--378. 2004.
\bibitem{davidsonDuclos} Davidson, Russell; Duclos, Jean-Yves. Statistical inference for stochastic dominance; for the measurement of poverty; inequality. \textit{Econometrica}. JSTOR. pp. 1435--1464. 2000.
\bibitem{Bernheim.ExAnteExPost} James Andreoni; Deniz Aydin; Blake Barton; B. Douglas Bernheim; Jeffrey Naecker. When Fair Isn't Fair: Sophisticated Time Inconsistency in Social Preferences. \textit{unpublished manuscript}. 2015.
\bibitem{kessler2014getting} Kessler, Judd B; Roth, Alvin E. Getting more organs for transplantation. \textit{The American Economic Review}. American Economic Association. vol. 104. no. 5. pp. 425--430. 2014.
\bibitem{NiederleRoth} Niederle, Muriel; Roth, Alvin E. Philanthropically Funded Heroism Awards for Kidney Donors. \textit{Law \& Contemporary Problems}. HeinOnline. vol. 77. pp. 131--144. 2014.
\bibitem{LeiderRoth} Leider, Stephen; Roth, Alvin E. Kidneys for sale: Who disapproves,; why?. \textit{American Journal of Transplantation}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 10. no. 5. pp. 1221--1227. 2010.
\bibitem{vanDenSteen} Eric van den Steen. Rational overoptimism (and other biases). \textit{American Economic Review}. JSTOR. pp. 1141--1151. 2004.
\bibitem{Posneretal.} Choi, Stephen J; Gulati, Mitu; Posner, Eric A. Altruism Exchanges; the Kidney Shortage. \textit{Law \& Contemporary Problems}. HeinOnline. vol. 77. pp. 289--322. 2014.
\bibitem{Rabin.JEBO} Rabin, Matthew. Cognitive dissonance; social change. \textit{Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}. Elsevier. vol. 23. no. 2. pp. 177--194. 1994.
\bibitem{kahnemanKnetschThaler} Kahneman, Daniel; Knetsch, Jack L; Thaler, Richard. Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market. \textit{The American Economic Review}. JSTOR. vol. 76. no. 4. pp. 728--741. 1986.
\bibitem{ERP2013} Economic Report of the President. Reducing Costs; Improving the Quality of Health Care. Government Printing Office. pp. 161-183. 2013.
\bibitem{FatigueLiver} Beavers, Kimberly L; Sandler, Robert S; Fair, Jeffrey H; Johnson, Mark W; Shrestha, Roshan. The living donor experience: donor health assessment; outcomes after living donor liver transplantation. \textit{Liver transplantation}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 7. no. 11. pp. 943--947. 2001.
\bibitem{FatigueKidney} Tellioglu, G; Berber, I; Yatkin, I; Yigit, B; Ozgezer, T; Gulle, S; Isitmangil, G; Caliskan, M; Titiz, I. Quality of life analysis of renal donors. \textit{Transplantation proceedings}. vol. 40. no. 1. pp. 50--52. 2008.
\bibitem{Ibrahim} Ibrahim, Hassan N; Foley, Robert; Tan, LiPing; Rogers, Tyson; Bailey, Robert F; Guo, Hongfei; Gross, Cynthia R; Matas, Arthur J. Long-term consequences of kidney donation. \textit{New England Journal of Medicine}. Mass Medical Soc. vol. 360. no. 5. pp. 459--469. 2009.
\bibitem{kidneLongTermNorway} Mj{\o}en, Geir; Hallan, Stein; Hartmann, Anders; Foss, Aksel; Midtvedt, Karsten; {\O}yen, Ole; Reis{\ae}ter, Anna; Pfeffer, Per; Jenssen, Trond; Leivestad, Torbj{\o}rn. Long-term risks for kidney donors. \textit{Kidney International}. Nature Publishing Group. vol. 86. no. 1. pp. 162--167. 2014.
\bibitem{Bodri} Bodri, Daniel. Risk; complications associated with egg donation. In Principles of Oocyte; Embryo Donation. Springer. pp. 205--219. 2013.
\bibitem{Gottlieb} Gottlieb, Daniel. Imperfect memory; choice under risk. \textit{Games; Economic Behavior}. Elsevier. vol. 85. pp. 127--158. 2014.
\bibitem{QuattroneTversky} Quattrone, George A; Tversky, Amos. Causal versus diagnostic contingencies: On self-deception; on the voter's illusion.. \textit{Journal of personality; social psychology}. American Psychological Association. vol. 46. no. 2. pp. 237. 1984.
\bibitem{churches} Alan C. Clark. The Challenge of Proselytism; the Calling to Common Witness. \textit{Ecumenical Review}. WORLD COUNCIL CHURCHES PUBLICATIONS OFFICE 150 ROUTE DE FERNEY, 1211 GENEVA 20, SWITZERLAND. vol. 48. no. 2. pp. 212--221. 1996.
\bibitem{Cave} Damien Cave. Critics Say It's Time to Overhaul The Army's Bonus System. \textit{New York Times}. 2005.
\bibitem{McCormick} McCormick, Patrick T. Volunteers; Incentives: Buying the Bodies of the Poor. \textit{Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics}. JSTOR. vol. 27. no. 1. pp. 77--93. 2007.
\bibitem{PosnerKidneys} Richard Posner. A Moral Market. \textit{Slate}. 2014.
\bibitem{Svitnev} Svitnev, Konstantin. Legal regulation of assisted reproduction treatment in Russia. \textit{Reproductive Biomedicine Online}. Elsevier. vol. 20. no. 7. pp. 892--894. 2010.
\bibitem{Ashrafetal.AwardsUnbundled} Ashraf, Nava; Bandiera, Oriana; Lee, Scott S. Awards unbundled: Evidence from a natural field experiment. \textit{Journal of Economic Behavior \&amp; Organization}. Elsevier. vol. 100. pp. 44--63. 2014.
\bibitem{Osteretal.Huntingtons} Oster, Emily; Shoulson, Ira; Dorsey, E. Optimal Expectations; Limited Medical Testing: Evidence from Huntington Disease. \textit{The American Economic Review}. American Economic Association. vol. 103. no. 2. pp. 804--830. 2013.
\bibitem{BesleyOnSandel} Besley, Timothy. What's the good of the market? An essay on Michael Sandel's what money can't buy. \textit{Journal of Economic Literature}. American Economic Association. vol. 51. no. 2. pp. 478--495. 2013.
\bibitem{xtdhreg} Engel, Christoph; Moffatt, Peter G. dhreg, xtdhreg,; bootdhreg: Commands to implement double-hurdle regression. \textit{Stata Journal}. StataCorp LP. vol. 14. no. 4. pp. 778--797. 2014.
\bibitem{Kunda} Kunda, Ziva. The case for motivated reasoning.. \textit{Psychological bulletin}. American Psychological Association. vol. 108. no. 3. pp. 480. 1990.
\bibitem{LordRossLepper} Lord, Charles G; Ross, Lee; Lepper, Mark R. Biased assimilation; attitude polarization: the effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence.. \textit{Journal of personality; social psychology}. American Psychological Association. vol. 37. no. 11. pp. 2098. 1979.
\bibitem{Saccardoetal.} Uri Gneezy; Silvia Saccardo; Marta Serra-Garcia; Roel van Veldhuizen. Motivated self-deception, identity,; unethical behavior. \textit{unpublished manuscript}. 2015.
\bibitem{GulPesendorfer.Temptation} Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang. Temptation; self-control. \textit{Econometrica}. JSTOR. pp. 1403--1435. 2001.
\bibitem{FestingerCarlsmith} Festinger, Leon; Carlsmith, James M. Cognitive consequences of forced compliance.. \textit{The Journal of Abnormal; Social Psychology}. American Psychological Association. vol. 58. no. 2. pp. 203. 1959.
\bibitem{cognitiveDissonance} Festinger, Leon. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford university press. vol. 2. 1962.
\bibitem{BayesianPersuasion} Gentzkow, Matthew; Kamenica, Emir. Bayesian persuasion. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 101. no. 6. pp. 2590--2615. 2011.
\bibitem{HuesmanWambach} Huesmann, Katharina; Wambach, Achim. Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns. 2015.
\bibitem{oDonoghueRabin} O'Donoghue, Ted; Rabin, Matthew. Doing it now or later. \textit{American Economic Review}. JSTOR. vol. 89. no. 1. pp. 103--124. 1999.
\bibitem{AugenblickNiederleSprenger} Augenblick, Ned; Niederle, Muriel; Sprenger, Charles. Working over time: Dynamic inconsistency in real effort tasks. \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics}. vol. 130. no. 3. 2015.
\bibitem{Fredericketal.timeInconsistent} Frederick, Shane; Loewenstein, George; o'Donoghue, Ted. Time discounting; time preference: A critical review. \textit{Journal of Economic Literature}. JSTOR. vol. 40. no. 2. pp. 351--401. 2002.
\bibitem{Laibson.goldenEggs} Laibson, David. Golden eggs; hyperbolic discounting. \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics}. JSTOR. pp. 443--477. 1997.
\bibitem{Laibson} article entry.
\bibitem{Eliasetal.prostitution} Elias, Julio J; Lacetera, Nicola; Macis, Mario. Markets; Morals: An Experimental Survey Study. \textit{PloS one}. Public Library of Science. vol. 10. no. 6. 2015.
\bibitem{Eliasetal.kidneys} Elias, Julio; Lacetera, Nicola; Macis, Mario. Sacred Values? The Effect of Information on Attitudes Toward Payments for Human Organs. \textit{American Economic Review, Papers \& Proceedings}. vol. 105. no. 5. pp. 361--365. 2015.
\bibitem{LargeStakesBigMistakes} Ariely, Dan; Gneezy, Uri; Loewenstein, George; Mazar, Nina. Large stakes; big mistakes. \textit{The Review of Economic Studies}. Oxford University Press. vol. 76. no. 2. pp. 451--469. 2009.
\bibitem{MalmendierSchmidt} Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus. You owe me. \textit{NBER working paper}. vol. 18543. 2012.
\bibitem{LoewensteinAngner} Loewenstein, George; Angner, Erik. Predicting; indulging changing preferences. \textit{Time; decision: Economic; psychological perspectives on intertemporal choice}. pp. 351--391. 2003.
\bibitem{Alevyetal.Anchoring} Alevy, Jonathan E; Landry, Craig E; List, John A. Field experiments on anchoring of economic valuations. \textit{Available at SSRN 1824400}. 2010.
\bibitem{Sunsteinetal.Anchoring} Sunstein, Cass R; Kahneman, Daniel; Schkade, David; Ritov, Ilana. Predictably incoherent judgments. \textit{Stanford Law Review}. JSTOR. pp. 1153--1215. 2002.
\bibitem{simonsonDrolet} Simonson, Itamar; Drolet, Aimee. Anchoring effects on consumers' willingness-to-pay; willingness-to-accept. \textit{Journal of Consumer Research}. The Oxford University Press. vol. 31. no. 3. pp. 681--690. 2004.
\bibitem{Bergmanetal.Anchoring} Bergman, Oscar; Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; Svensson, Cicek. Anchoring; cognitive ability. \textit{Economics Letters}. Elsevier. vol. 107. no. 1. pp. 66--68. 2010.
\bibitem{BeggsGraddy.Anchoring} Beggs, Alan; Graddy, Kathryn. Anchoring effects: Evidence from art auctions. \textit{The American Economic Review}. JSTOR. pp. 1027--1039. 2009.
\bibitem{vatican} Vatican Radio. Pope Francis meets a group of transplant surgeons; including the mayor of Rome. 2014.
\bibitem{openLetterObama} Nir Eyal; Julio Frenk; Michele B. Goodwin; Lori Gruen; Gary R. Hall; Douglas W. Hanto; Frances Kissling; Ruth Macklin; Steven Pinker; Lloyd E. Ratner; Harold T. Shapiro; Peter Singer; Andrew W. Torrance; Robert D. Truog; Robert M. Veatch. An Open Letter to President Barack Obama, Secretary of Health; Human Services Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Attorney General Eric Holder; Leaders of Congress. 2014.
\bibitem{SatelCronin} Satel, Sally; Cronin, David C. Time to Test Incentives to Increase Organ Donation. \textit{JAMA internal medicine}. vol. 175. no. 8. pp. 1329-1330. 2015.
\bibitem{MichiganHSAA} Michigan High School Athletic Association. The History, Rationale; Application of the Essential Regulations of High School Athletics in Michigan. 2015.
\bibitem{IndianaHSAA} Indiana High School Athletic Association. By-Laws \& Articles of Incorporation. 2015.
\bibitem{AlabamaHSAA} Alabama High School Athletic Association. Handbook. 2015.
\bibitem{KentuckyHSAA} Kentucky High School Athletic Association. Handbook. 2014.
\bibitem{NCAAbylaws} National Collegiate Athletic Association. Division 1 Manual. 2015.
\bibitem{Selten.QSR} Selten, Reinhard. Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule. \textit{Experimental Economics}. Springer. vol. 1. no. 1. pp. 43--62. 1998.
\bibitem{Smith.InducedPreferences} Smith, Vernon L. Experimental economics: Induced value theory. \textit{The American Economic Review}. JSTOR. pp. 274--279. 1976.
\bibitem{Hortonetal.} John J. Horton; David G. Rand; Richard J. Zeckhauser. The online laboratory: Conducting experiments in a real labor market. \textit{Experimental Economics}. vol. 14. pp. 399-425. 2011.
\bibitem{MasonSuri} Winter Mason; Siddarth Suri. Conducting behavioral research on Amazon's Mechanical Turk. \textit{Behavioral Research}. vol. 44. pp. 1-23. 2012.
\bibitem{MarksMiller.falseConsensus} Marks, Gary; Miller, Norman. Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An empirical; theoretical review.. \textit{Psychological Bulletin}. American Psychological Association. vol. 102. no. 1. pp. 72. 1987.
\bibitem{Rossetal.FalseConsensus} Ross, Lee; Greene, David; House, Pamela. The ``false consensus effect'': An egocentric bias in social perception; attribution processes. \textit{Journal of experimental social psychology}. Elsevier. vol. 13. no. 3. pp. 279--301. 1977.
\bibitem{Brenneretal.OneSided} Brenner, Lyle A; Koehler, Derek J; Tversky, Amos. On the evaluation of one-sided evidence. \textit{Journal of Behavioral Decision Making}. Citeseer. vol. 9. no. 1. pp. 59--70. 1996.
\bibitem{Topkis} Milgrom, Paul; Shannon, Chris. Monotone comparative statics. \textit{Econometrica}. JSTOR. pp. 157--180. 1994.
\bibitem{Gilletal.} Gill, Jagbir; Dong, Jianghu; Gill, John. Population income; longitudinal trends in living kidney donation in the United States. \textit{J Am Soc Nephrol}. vol. 26. 2014.
\bibitem{Rosenberg2} Tina Rosenberg. It's Time to Compensate Kidney Donors. 2015.
\bibitem{Sickandetal.} Sickand, M; Cuerden, MS; Klarenbach, SW; Ojo, AO; Parikh, CR; Boudville, N; Garg, AX. Reimbursing Live Organ Donors for Incurred Non-Medical Expenses: A Global Perspective on Policies; Programs. \textit{American Journal of Transplantation}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 9. no. 12. pp. 2825--2836. 2009.
\bibitem{Singapore} Singapore Ministry of Health. Human Organ Transplant Act. 2010.
\bibitem{Khaleeli} Homa Khaleeli. The hair trade's dirty secret. \textit{The Guardian}. 2012.
\bibitem{AkerlofDickens} Akerlof, George A; Dickens, William T. The economic consequences of cognitive dissonance. \textit{The American economic review}. JSTOR. pp. 307--319. 1982.
\bibitem{poopWashingtonPost} Rachel Feltman. You can earn \$13,000 a year selling your poop. \textit{Washington Post}. 2015.
\bibitem{CampbellGuardian} Denis Campbell. Egg; sperm donors to be paid more compensation. \textit{The Guardian}. 2011.
\bibitem{EggGermany} Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen \textsection 1 Missbrauchliche Anwendung von Fortpflanzungstechniken. 1990.
\bibitem{financialIncentivesEggs} American Society for Reproductive Medicine. Financial compensation of oocyte donors. \textit{Fertility; Sterility}. Elsevier. vol. 88. no. 2. pp. 305--309. 2007.
\bibitem{CouncilOfEurope} Council of Europe. Medically assisted procreation; the protection of the human embryo. Comparative study on the situation in 39 states.. 1998.
\bibitem{Gamble} Gamble, Natalie. Crossing the line: the legal; ethical problems of foreign surrogacy. \textit{Reproductive biomedicine online}. Elsevier. vol. 19. no. 2. pp. 151--152. 2009.
\bibitem{Drabiaketal.} Drabiak, Katherine; Wegner, Carole; Fredland, Valita; Helft, Paul R. Ethics, law,; commercial surrogacy: a call for uniformity. \textit{The Journal of Law, Medicine \& Ethics}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 35. no. 2. pp. 300--309. 2007.
\bibitem{Arons} Arons, Jessica. Future choices: Assisted reproductive technologies; the law. \textit{Center for American Progress}. 2007.
\bibitem{NakashHerdiman} Nakash, A; Herdiman, J. Surrogacy. \textit{Journal of obstetrics; gynaecology}. Informa Healthcare. vol. 27. no. 3. pp. 246--251. 2007.
\bibitem{Vohsetal.Money} Vohs, Kathleen D; Mead, Nicole L; Goode, Miranda R. The psychological consequences of money. \textit{science}. American Association for the Advancement of Science. vol. 314. no. 5802. pp. 1154--1156. 2006.
\bibitem{BartlingWeber} Bartling, Bj{\"o}rn; Weber, Roberto A; Yao, Lan. Do Markets Erode Social Responsibility?. \textit{The Quarterly Journal of Economics}. Oxford University Press. vol. 130. no. 1. pp. 219--266. 2015.
\bibitem{FalkSzech} Falk, Armin; Szech, Nora. Morals; markets. \textit{Science}. American Association for the Advancement of Science. vol. 340. no. 6133. pp. 707--711. 2013.
\bibitem{Roth.repugnance} Roth, Alvin E. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. \textit{Journal of Economic Perspectives}. American Economic Association. vol. 21. no. 3. pp. 37-58. 2007.
\bibitem{Maniadisetal.Anchoring} Maniadis, Zacharias; Tufano, Fabio; List, John A. One swallow doesn't make a summer: New evidence on anchoring effects. \textit{The American Economic Review}. American Economic Association. vol. 104. no. 1. pp. 277--290. 2014.
\bibitem{Fudenbergetal.Anchoring} Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K; Maniadis, Zacharias. On the robustness of anchoring effects in WTP; WTA experiments. \textit{American Economic Journal: Microeconomics}. American Economic Association. vol. 4. no. 2. pp. 131--145. 2012.
\bibitem{BeckerElias} Becker, Gary S.; Elias, Julio J.. Introducing incentives in the market for live; cadaveric organ donations. \textit{The Journal of Economic Perspectives}. JSTOR. vol. 21. no. 3. pp. 3--24. 2007.
\bibitem{Kanbur} Kanbur, Ravi. On obnoxious markets. In Globalization, Culture; the Limits of the Market: Essays in Economics; Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 2004.
\bibitem{Rozinetal.SympatheticMagic} Rozin, Paul; Millman, Linda; Nemeroff, Carol. Operation of the laws of sympathetic magic in disgust; other domains.. \textit{Journal of personality; social psychology}. American Psychological Association. vol. 50. no. 4. pp. 703. 1986.
\bibitem{Keisneretal.} Keisner, Deborah Kerley; Messer, Kent D; Schulze, William D; Zarghamee, Homa. Testing Social Preferences for an Economic ``Bad'': An Artefactual Field Experiment*. \textit{The Scandinavian Journal of Economics}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 115. no. 1. pp. 27--61. 2013.
\bibitem{DebbieStevens} abc News. N.Y. Mom Fired After Donating Kidney To Help Her Boss. 2012.
\bibitem{Stracketal.DDM} Drew Fudenberg; Philipp Strack; Tomasz Strzalecki. Stochastic Choice; Optimal Sequential Sampling. \textit{Working paper, Harvard University}. 2015.
\bibitem{PinkerOpEd} Steven Pinker. The Moral Imperative For Bioethics. \textit{The Boston Globe}. 2015.
\bibitem{KR2006} K{\H{o}}szegi, Botond; Rabin, Matthew. A model of reference-dependent preferences. \textit{The Quarterly Journal of Economics}. JSTOR. pp. 1133--1165. 2006.
\bibitem{Cragg} Cragg, John G. Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to the demand for durable goods. \textit{Econometrica}. JSTOR. vol. 39. no. 5. pp. 829--844. 1971.
\bibitem{LinSchmidt} Lin, Tsai-Fen; Schmidt, Peter. A test of the Tobit specification against an alternative suggested by Cragg. \textit{The Review of Economics; Statistics}. JSTOR. pp. 174--177. 1984.
\bibitem{MatejkaMcKayAER} Mat{\v{e}}jka, Filip; McKay, Alisdair. Rational inattention to discrete choices: A new foundation for the multinomial logit model. \textit{American Economic Review}. American Economic Association. vol. 105. no. 1. pp. 272--98. 2015.
\bibitem{Basu.Coercion} Basu, Kaushik. Coercion, Contract; the Limits of the Market. \textit{Social Choice; Welfare}. Springer. vol. 29. no. 4. pp. 559--579. 2007.
\bibitem{BasuJEP} Basu, Kaushik. The economics; law of sexual harassment in the workplace. \textit{The Journal of Economic Perspectives}. American Economic Association. vol. 17. no. 3. pp. 141--157. 2003.
\bibitem{FreyJegen} Frey, Bruno S; Jegen, Reto. Motivation Crowding Theory. \textit{Journal of Economic Surveys}. Wiley Blackwell. vol. 15. no. 5. pp. 589--611. 2001.
\bibitem{Titmuss} Richard Titmuss. The gift relationship: From human blood to social policy. Allen \& Unwin. 1970.
\bibitem{Fershtmanetal.} Fershtman, Chaim; Gneezy, Uri; Hoffman, Moshe. Taboos; identity: Considering the unthinkable. \textit{American Economic Journal: Microeconomics}. JSTOR. pp. 139--164. 2011.
\bibitem{Raven} Raven, John C. Guide to the standard progressive matrices: sets A, B, C, D; E. Pearson. 1960.
\bibitem{Inbaretal.} Inbar, Yoel; Pizarro, David A; Bloom, Paul. Conservatives are more easily disgusted than liberals. \textit{Cognition; Emotion}. Taylor \& Francis. vol. 23. no. 4. pp. 714--725. 2009.
\bibitem{Carneyetal.} Carney, Dana R; Jost, John T; Gosling, Samuel D; Potter, Jeff. The secret lives of liberals; conservatives: Personality profiles, interaction styles,; the things they leave behind. \textit{Political Psychology}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 29. no. 6. pp. 807--840. 2008.
\bibitem{Rozinetal.} Rozin, Paul; Haidt, Jonathan; McCauley, Clark R. Disgust. Guilford Press. 2008.
\bibitem{UNentomophagy} Food; Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Edible insects Future prospects for food; feed security. 2013.
\bibitem{Macklin} Macklin, Ruth. `Due'; `Undue' Inducements: On Paying Money to Research Subjects. \textit{IRB}. JSTOR. vol. 3. no. 5. pp. 1--6. 1981.
\bibitem{Kuczewski} Kuczewski, Mark. Is informed consent enough? Monetary incentives for research participation; the integrity of biomedicine. \textit{American Journal of Bioethics}. Taylor \& Francis. vol. 1. no. 2. pp. 49--51. 2001.
\bibitem{Ripley} Ripley, Elizabeth BD. A review of paying research participants: It's time to move beyond the ethical debate. \textit{Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics}. SAGE Publications. vol. 1. no. 4. pp. 9--19. 2006.
\bibitem{NurembergCode} Nuremberg Code. In Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg military tribunals under control council law. vol. 10. pp. 181-182. 1949.
\bibitem{BelmontReport} National Commission for the Proptection of Human Subjects of Biomedical; Behavioral Research, Bethesda, MD.. The Belmont report: Ethical principles; guidelines for the protection of human subjects of research. 1978.
\bibitem{Casarettetal.} Casarett, David; Karlawish, Jason; Asch, David A. Paying hypertension research subjects. \textit{Journal of general internal medicine}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 17. no. 8. pp. 651--653. 2002.
\bibitem{Gradyetal.Empirical} Grady, Christine; Dickert, Neal; Jawetz, Tom; Gensler, Gary; Emanuel, Ezekiel. An analysis of US practices of paying research participants. \textit{Contemporary clinical trials}. Elsevier. vol. 26. no. 3. pp. 365--375. 2005.
\bibitem{BernheimRangelAddiction} B. Douglas Bernheim; Antonio Rangel. Addiction; Cue-Triggered Decision Processes. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 94. no. 5. pp. 1558-90. 2004.
\bibitem{BernheimRangelWelfare} B. Douglas Bernheim; Antonio Rangel. Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics. \textit{The Quarterly Journal of Economics}. vol. 124. no. 1. pp. 51-104. 2009.
\bibitem{BernheimWelfareReview} B. Douglas Bernheim. Behavioral Welfare Economics. \textit{Journal of the European Economic Association}. vol. 7. no. 2-3. pp. 267-319. 2009.
\bibitem{Slovic} Slovic, Paul. The construction of preference.. \textit{American psychologist}. American Psychological Association. vol. 50. no. 5. pp. 364. 1995.
\bibitem{LichtensteinSlovic} Lichtenstein, Sarah; Slovic, Paul. The construction of preference. Cambridge University Press. 2006.
\bibitem{coherentArbitrariness} Ariely, Dan; Loewenstein, George; Prelec, Drazen. `Coherent Arbitrariness': Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences. \textit{The Quarterly Journal of Economics}. MIT Press. vol. 118. no. 1. pp. 73--105. 2003.
\bibitem{HolmstromMyerson} Holmstr{\"o}m, Bengt; Myerson, Roger B. Efficient; durable decision rules with incomplete information. \textit{Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society}. JSTOR. pp. 1799--1819. 1983.
\bibitem{Freakonomics} Levitt, Steven D; Dubner, Stephen J. Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything. William Morrow. 2005.
\bibitem{McGregor} McGregor, Joan. `Undue Inducement'as Coercive Offers'. \textit{The American Journal of Bioethics}. Taylor \& Francis. vol. 5. no. 5. pp. 24--25. 2005.
\bibitem{EmanuelNonsenseOnStilts} Emanuel, Ezekiel J. Undue inducement: Nonsense on stilts?. \textit{The American Journal of Bioethics}. Taylor \& Francis. vol. 5. no. 5. pp. 9--13. 2005.
\bibitem{EmanuelEndingConcerns} Emanuel, Ezekiel J. Ending concerns about undue inducement. \textit{The Journal of Law, Medicine \& Ethics}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 32. no. 1. pp. 100--105. 2004.
\bibitem{Spital} Spital, Aaron. Living organ donation: Shifting responsibility. \textit{Archives of internal medicine}. American Medical Association. vol. 151. no. 2. pp. 234--235. 1991.
\bibitem{Delmonicoetal.} Delmonico, FL; Martin, D; Dom{\'\i}nguez-Gil, B; Muller, E; Jha, V; Levin, A; Danovitch, GM; Capron, AM. Living; Deceased Organ Donation Should Be Financially Neutral Acts. \textit{American Journal of Transplantation}. Wiley Online Library. 2015.
\bibitem{Salomonetal.} Salomon, DR; Langnas, AN; Reed, AI; Bloom, RD; Magee, JC; Gaston, RS. AST/ASTS workshop on increasing organ donation in the United States: Creating an ``arc of change'' from removing disincentives to testing incentives. \textit{American Journal of Transplantation}. Wiley Online Library. 2015.
\bibitem{KahnemanTversky1974} Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics; biases. \textit{Science}. American Association for the Advancement of Science. vol. 185. no. 4157. pp. 1124--1131. 1974.
\bibitem{Stanovichetal.} Stanovich, Keith E; West, Richard F; Toplak, Maggie E. Myside bias, rational thinking,; intelligence. \textit{Current Directions in Psychological Science}. Sage Publications. vol. 22. no. 4. pp. 259--264. 2013.
\bibitem{Fisheretal.} Fisher, JS; Butt, Z; Friedewald, J; Fry-Revere, S; Hanneman, J; Henderson, ML; Ladin, K; Mysel, H; Preczewski, L; Sherman, LA; others. Between Scylla; Charybdis: Charting an Ethical Course for Research Into Financial Incentives for Living Kidney Donation. \textit{American Journal of Transplantation}. Wiley Online Library. 2015.
\bibitem{NBAC} National Bioethics Advisory Commission. Ethical; policy issues in research involving human participants. 2001.
\bibitem{Grant} Grant, Ruth W. Strings attached: Untangling the ethics of incentives. Princeton University Press. 2011.
\bibitem{Sandel} Sandel, Michael J. What money can't buy: the moral limits of markets. Macmillan. 2012.
\bibitem{Abeleretal.} Johannes Abeler; Anke Becker; Armin Falk. Truth-Telling - A Representative Assessment. \textit{mimeo}. 2012.
\bibitem{Cryderetal.} Cynthia E. Cryder; Alex John London; Kevin G. Volpp; George Loewenstein. Informative inducement: Study payment as a signal of risk. \textit{Social Science \& Medicine}. vol. 70. pp. 455-464. 2010.
\bibitem{EratGneezy} S. Era; Uri Gneezy. White Lies. \textit{Management Science}. vol. 58. no. 4. pp. 723-733. 2012.
\bibitem{FischbacherHeusi} Urs Fischbacher; Franziska Heusi. Lies In Disguise: An Experimental Study on Cheating. \textit{TWI Research Paper Series}. 2008.
\bibitem{Gneezy} Uri Gneezy. Deception: The Role of Consequences. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 95. no. 1. pp. 384-394. 2005.
\bibitem{Hannanetal.} R. Lynn Hannan; Frederick W. Rankin; Kristy L. Towry. The Effect of Information Systems on Honesty in Managerial Reporting: A Behavioral Perspective. \textit{Contemporary Accounting Research}. vol. 23. no. 4. pp. 885-918. 2006.
\bibitem{HaoHouser} Li Hao; Daniel Houser. Honest Lies. \textit{mimeo}. 2010.
\bibitem{HurkensKartik} Sjaak Hurkens; Navin Kartik. Would I lie to you? On Social Preferences; Lying Aversion. \textit{Experimental Economics}. vol. 12. pp. 180-192. 2009.
\bibitem{Kline} Paul Kline. Handbook of Psychological Testing. Routledge. 1999.
\bibitem{Loewensteinetal.ProjectionBias} George Loewenstein; Ted O'Donogue; Matthew Rabin. Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility. \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics}. vol. 118. no. 4. pp. 1209-1248. 2003.
\bibitem{LopezPerezSpiegelman} Rau Lopez-Perez; Eli Spiegelman. Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion. \textit{Experimental Economics}. forthcoming.
\bibitem{Lundquistetal.} Tobias Lundquist; Tore Ellingsen; Erik Gribbe; Magnus Johannesson. The Aversion To Lying. \textit{Journal of Economic Behavior; Organization}. vol. 70. pp. 81-92. 2009.
\bibitem{MazarAriely} Nina Mazar; Dan Ariely. The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance. \textit{Journal of Marketing Research}. vol. 45. no. 6. pp. 633-644. 2008.
\bibitem{Satz} Debra Satz. Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets. Oxford University Press. 2010.
\bibitem{Shleiferetal.AERPP} Nicola Gennaioli; Andrei Shleifer; Robert Vishny. Neglected Risks: The Psychology of Financial Crises. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 105. no. 5. 2015.
\bibitem{BarberOdean.AllThatGlitters} Barber, Brad M; Odean, Terrance. All that glitters: The effect of attention; news on the buying behavior of individual; institutional investors. \textit{Review of Financial Studies}. Soc Financial Studies. vol. 21. no. 2. pp. 785--818. 2008.
\bibitem{DellaVignaPollet} DellaVigna, Stefano; Pollet, Joshua M. Investor inattention; Friday earnings announcements. \textit{The Journal of Finance}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 64. no. 2. pp. 709--749. 2009.
\bibitem{DoskelandHvide} D{\o}skeland, Trond M; Hvide, Hans K. Do individual investors have asymmetric information based on work experience?. \textit{The Journal of Finance}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 66. no. 3. pp. 1011--1041. 2011.
\bibitem{Daetal.} Da, Zhi; Engelberg, Joseph; Gao, Pengjie. In search of attention. \textit{The Journal of Finance}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 66. no. 5. pp. 1461--1499. 2011.
\bibitem{Huoetal.} Hou, Kewei; Xiong, Wei; Peng, Lin. A tale of two anomalies: The implications of investor attention for price; earnings momentum. \textit{Available at SSRN 976394}. 2009.
\bibitem{Gherzietal.} Gherzi, Svetlana; Egan, Daniel; Stewart, Neil; Haisley, Emily; Ayton, Peter. The meerkat effect: Personality; market returns affect investors' portfolio monitoring behaviour. \textit{Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}. Elsevier. vol. 107. pp. 512--526. 2014.
\bibitem{Luetkepohletal.} Argentesi, Elena; L{\"u}tkepohl, Helmut; Motta, Massimo. Acquisition of information; share prices: An empirical investigation of cognitive dissonance. \textit{German Economic Review}. vol. 11. no. 3. pp. 381-396. 2010.
\bibitem{BarberisThaler} Barberis, Nicholas; Thaler, Richard. A survey of behavioral finance. \textit{Handbook of the Economics of Finance}. Elsevier. vol. 1. pp. 1053--1128. 2003.
\bibitem{GrossmanOwens} Grossman, Zachary; Owens, David. An unlucky feeling: Overconfidence; noisy feedback. \textit{Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}. Elsevier. vol. 84. no. 2. pp. 510--524. 2012.
\bibitem{CaplinLeahy} Caplin, Andrew; Leahy, John. Psychological expected utility theory; anticipatory feelings. \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics}. JSTOR. vol. 116. no. 1. pp. 55--79. 2001.
\bibitem{Moutsianaetal.} Moutsiana, Christina; Garrett, Neil; Clarke, Richard C; Lotto, R Beau; Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne; Sharot, Tali. Human development of the ability to learn from bad news. \textit{Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences}. National Acad Sciences. vol. 110. no. 41. pp. 16396--16401. 2013.
\bibitem{Sims2003} Sims, Christopher A. Implications of rational inattention. \textit{Journal of Monetary Economics}. Elsevier. vol. 50. no. 3. pp. 665--690. 2003.
\bibitem{FehrRangel} Ernst Fehr; Antonio Rangel. Neuroeconomic foundations of economic choice---recent advances. \textit{The Journal of Economic Perspectives}. vol. 25. no. 4. pp. 3-30. 2011.
\bibitem{WaldWolfowitz} Abraham Wald; J. Wolfowitz. Optimum character of the sequential probability ratio test. \textit{Annals of Mathematical Statistics}. vol. 19. pp. 326-339. 1948.
\bibitem{Wald} Abraham Wald. Sequential Analysis. New York: Wiley. 1947.
\bibitem{HirshleiferYu} Hirshleifer, David A; Yu, Jianfeng. Asset pricing in production economies with extrapolative expectations. In AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper. 2013.
\bibitem{Fusteretal.} Fuster, Andreas; Laibson, David; Mendel, Brock. Natural expectations; macroeconomic fluctuations. \textit{The journal of economic perspectives: a journal of the American Economic Association}. NIH Public Access. vol. 24. no. 4. pp. 67. 2010.
\bibitem{GreenwoodShleifer} Greenwood, Robin; Shleifer, Andrei. Expectations of returns; expected returns. \textit{Review of Financial Studies}. Soc Financial Studies. vol. 27. no. 3. 2014.
\bibitem{Nelsonetal.} Nelson, Jonathan D; McKenzie, Craig RM; Cottrell, Garrison W; Sejnowski, Terrence J. Experience matters information acquisition optimizes probability gain. \textit{Psychological science}. Sage Publications. vol. 21. no. 7. pp. 960--969. 2010.
\bibitem{KlaymanHa} Klayman, Joshua; Ha, Young-Won. Confirmation, disconfirmation,; information in hypothesis testing.. \textit{Psychological review}. American Psychological Association. vol. 94. no. 2. pp. 211. 1987.
\bibitem{Roetheli} R{\"o}theli, Tobias F. Pattern-based expectations: International experimental evidence; applications in financial economics. \textit{Review of Economics; Statistics}. The MIT Press. vol. 93. no. 4. pp. 1319--1330. 2011.
\bibitem{Barberisetal.InvestorSentiment} Barberis, Nicholas; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert. A model of investor sentiment. \textit{Journal of financial economics}. Elsevier. vol. 49. no. 3. pp. 307--343. 1998.
\bibitem{AmbuehlLi} Sandro Ambuehl; Shengwu Li. Belief Updating; the Demand for Information. \textit{unpublished manuscript, Stanford University}. 2015.
\bibitem{Abdellaouietal.} Mohammed Abdellaoui; Peter Klibanoff; Laetitia Placido. Ambiguity; Compound Risk Attitudes: an Experiment. \textit{mimeo}. 2011.
\bibitem{AbrevayaJiang} Jason Abrevaya; Wei Jiang. A Nonparametric Approach to Measuring; Testing Curvature. \textit{Journal of Business; Economic Statistics}. vol. 23. no. 1. pp. 1-19. 2005.
\bibitem{Allen} Allen, Franklin. Discovering personal probabilities when utility functions are unknown. \textit{Management Science}. vol. 33. no. 4. pp. 307-319. 1987.
\bibitem{AndersenMPL} Steffen Andersen; Glenn W. Harrison; Mortel I. Lau; E. Elisabet Rutstrom. Elicitation using multiple price list formats. \textit{Experimental Economics}. vol. 9. pp. 383-405. 2006.
\bibitem{AndreoniMylovanov} James Andreoni; Tymofiy Mylovanov. Diverging Opinions. \textit{American Economic Journal: Microeconomics}. vol. 4. no. 1. pp. 209-232. 2012.
\bibitem{AndreoniSprengerRiskTime} James Andreoni; Charles Sprenger. Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 102. no. 7. pp. 3357-3376. 2012.
\bibitem{AndreoniSprengerUncertaintyEquivalents} James Andreoni; Charles Sprenger. Uncertainty Equivalents: Testing the Limits of the Independence Axiom. \textit{NBER working paper}. vol. w17342. 2013.
\bibitem{Antoniouetal.} Constantinos Antoniou,; Glenn W. Harrison,; Morten I. Lau,; Daniel Read. Information Characteristics; Errors in Expectations: Experimental Evidence. \textit{mimeo, University of Warwick}. 2014.
\bibitem{AtheyLevin} Susan Athey; Jonathan Levin. The Value of Information in Monotone Decision Problems. \textit{mimeo. Stanford University.}. 2001.
\bibitem{AugenblickRabin} Ned Augenblick; Matthew Rabin. Testing for Excess Movement in Beliefs. \textit{mimeo}. 2015.
\bibitem{AzrielyLehrer} Yaron Azrieli; Ehud Lehrer. The value of a stochastic information structure. \textit{Games; Economic Behavior}. vol. 63. pp. 679-693. 2008.
\bibitem{barronerev} Greg Barron; Ido Erev. Small feedback-based decisions; their limited correspondence to description-based decisions. \textit{Journal of Behavioral Decision Making}. vol. 16. pp. 215-233. 2003.
\bibitem{BastardiShafir} Anthony Bastardi; Eldar Shafir. On the Pursuit; Misuse of Useless Information. \textit{Journal of Personality; Social Psychology}. vol. 75. no. 1. pp. 19-32. 1998.
\bibitem{BernasconiLoomes} Michele Bernasconi; Graham Loomes. Failures of the Reduction Principle in an Ellsberg-Type Problem. \textit{Theory; Decision}. vol. 32. no. 1. pp. 77-100. 1992.
\bibitem{BrunnermeierParker} Markus K. Brunnermeier; Jonathan A. Parker. Optimal Expectations. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 95. no. 4. pp. 1092-1118. 2005.
\bibitem{Burksetal.} Stephen V. Burks; Jeffrey P. Carpenter; Lorenz Goette; Aldo Rustichini. Overconfidence; Social Signaling. \textit{Review of Economic Studies}. vol. 80. no. 3. pp. 949-983. 2013.
\bibitem{Cabralesetal.} Antonio Cabrales; Olivier Gossner; Roberto Serrano. Entropy; the Value of Information for Investors. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 103. no. 1. pp. 360-377. 2013.
\bibitem{Cabralesetal.Appeal} Antonio Cabrales; Olivier Gossner; Roberto Serrano. The Appeal of Information Transactions. \textit{Working paper}. 2013.
\bibitem{CamererOverview} Colin Camerer. Individual Decision Making. In Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press. pp. 587-683. 1995.
\bibitem{Caplinetal.} Andrew Caplin; Mark Dean; Daniel Martin. Search; Satisficing. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 101. no. 7. 2011.
\bibitem{CarlssonVanDamme} Hans Carlsson; Eric van Damme. Global Games; Equilibrium Selection. \textit{Econometrica}. vol. 61. no. 5. pp. 989-1018. 1993.
\bibitem{CharnessLevin} Gary Charness; Dan Levin. When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity,; Affect. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 95. no. 4. pp. 1300-1309. 2005.
\bibitem{ChettySaez} Raj Chetty; Emmanuel Saez. Teaching the Tax Code: Earnings Responses to an Experiment with EITC Recipients. \textit{American Economic Journal: Applied Economics}. vol. 5. no. 1. pp. 1-31. 2013.
\bibitem{CopelandFriedman} Copeland, T.; Friedman, D.. The effect of sequential information arrival on asset prices: An experimental study.. \textit{Journal of Finance}. vol. 42. 1987.
\bibitem{CostaGomezetal.} Miguel A. Costa-Gomes; Steffen Huck; Georg Weizsaecker. Beliefs; actions in the trust game: Creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect. \textit{Discussion Paper, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung}. vol. SP II 2012-302. 2012.
\bibitem{CRT} Shane Frederick. Cognitive Reflection; Decision Making. \textit{The Journal of Economic Perspectives}. vol. 19. no. 4. pp. 25-42. 2005.
\bibitem{Danaetal.} Jason Dana; Roberto A. Weber; Jason Xi Kuang. Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory Preference for Fairness. \textit{Economic Theory}. vol. 33. pp. 67-80. 2007.
\bibitem{danieletal} Kent Daniel; David Hirshleifer; Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. Investor Psychology; security market under-; overreactions. \textit{The Journal of Finance}. vol. 53. pp. 1839-1885. 1998.
\bibitem{Dekeletal.} Eddie Dekel; Barton B. Lipman; Aldo Rustichini. Standard state-space models preclude unawareness. \textit{Econometrica}. vol. 66. no. 1. pp. 159-173. 1998.
\bibitem{duffyfeltovich} John Duffy; Nick Feltovich. Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An Expermental Study. \textit{International Journal of Game Theory}. vol. 28. no. 1. pp. 131-152. 1999.
\bibitem{Dyson2004} Freeman Dyson. A meeting with \uppercase{E}nrico \uppercase{F}ermi. \textit{Nature}. vol. 427. pp. 297. 2004.
\bibitem{EdererManso} Florian Ederer; Gustavo Manso. Is Pay-for-performance Detrimental to Innovation?. \textit{mimeo}. 2012.
\bibitem{EilRao} David Eil; Justin M. Rao. The Good News-Bad News Effect: Asymmetric Processing of Objective Information about Yourself. \textit{American Economic Journal: Microeconomics}. vol. 3. pp. 114-138. 2011.
\bibitem{ElGamalGrether} Mahmoud A. El-Gamal; David M. Grether. Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies. \textit{Journal of the American Statistical Association}. vol. 90. no. 432. 1995.
\bibitem{EliazSchotter} Kfir Eliaz; Andrew Schotter. Paying for confidence: An experimental study of the demand for non-instrumental information. \textit{Games; Economic Behavior}. vol. 70. pp. 304-324. 2010.
\bibitem{EliazSpiegler} Kfir Eliaz; Ran Spiegler. Can anticipatory feelings explain anomalous choices of information sources?. \textit{Games; Economic Behavior}. vol. 56. pp. 87-104. 2006.
\bibitem{Enikopolovetal.} Ruben Enikolopov; Maria Petrova; Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. Media; Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 101. pp. 3253 - 3285. 2011.
\bibitem{EpperFehrDuda} Helga Fehr-Duda; Thomas Epper. Probability; Risk: Foundations; Economic Implications of Probability-Dependent Risk Preferences. \textit{Annual Reviews of Economics}. vol. 4. no. 567-593. 2012.
\bibitem{EpsteinLivingWithRisk} Larry G. Epstein. Living With Risk. \textit{Review of Economic Studies}. vol. 75. pp. 1121-1141. 2008.
\bibitem{ErevHaruvy} Ido Erev; Ernan Haruvy. Learning; the Economics of Small Decisions. In The Handbook of Experimental Economics. vol. 2. 2015.
\bibitem{ErginGul} Haluk Ergin; Faruk Gul. A theory of subjective compound lotteries. \textit{Journal of Economic Theory}. vol. 144. pp. 899-929. 2009.
\bibitem{Ertac} Seda Ertac. Does self-relevance affect information processing? Experimental evidence on the response to performance; non-performance feedback. \textit{Journal of Economic Behavior; Organization}. vol. 80. pp. 532-545. 2011.
\bibitem{FalkZimmermann} Armin Falk; Florian Zimmermann. Beliefs; Utility: Experimental Evidence on Preferences for Information. \textit{Mimeo, University of Zurich}. 2014.
\bibitem{FiedlerBook} Information Sampling; Adaptive Cognition. Cambridge University Press. 2006.
\bibitem{Frederick2005} Frederick, Shane. Cognitive reflection; decision making. \textit{Journal of Economic Perspectives}. JSTOR. pp. 25--42. 2005.
\bibitem{Gabaixetal.} Xavier Gabaix; David Laibson; Guillermo Moloche; Stephen Weinberg. Costly Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 96. no. 4. 2006.
\bibitem{GentzkowShapiroMediaBiasReputation} Matthew Gentzkow; Jesse M. Shapiro. Media Bias; Reputation. \textit{Journal of Political Economy}. vol. 114. no. 2. pp. 280 - 316. 2006.
\bibitem{GentzkowShapiroMediaSlant} MAtthew Gentzkow; Jesse M. Shapiro. What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers. \textit{Econometrica}. vol. 78. no. 1. pp. 35-71. 2010.
\bibitem{GneezyListWu} Uri Gneezy; John A. List; George Wu. The Uncertainty Effect: When a risky prospect is valued less than it's worst possible outcome. \textit{The Quarterly Journal of Economics}. vol. 121. no. 4. pp. 1283-1309. 2006.
\bibitem{GoldsteinEinhorn} W.M. Goldstein; H.J. Einhorn. Expression theory; the preference reversal phenomena. \textit{Psychological Review}. vol. 94. pp. 236-254. 1987.
\bibitem{GonzalesWu} Richard Gonzalez; George Wu. On the Shape of the Probability Weighting Function. \textit{Cognitive Psychology}. vol. 38. pp. 129-166. 1999.
\bibitem{Greene} William H. Greene. Econometric Analysis. Pearson Prentice Hall. 2008.
\bibitem{Grether92} David M. Grether. Testing bayes rule; the representativeness heuristic: Some experimental evidence. \textit{Journal of Economic Behavior; Organization}. vol. 17. no. 1. pp. 31-57. 1992.
\bibitem{GretherQJE} David M. Grether. Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic. \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics}. vol. 95. no. 3. pp. 537-557. 1980.
\bibitem{GretschkoRajko} Vitali Gretschko; Alexander Rajko. Excess information acquisition in auctions. \textit{Experimental Economics}. 2014.
\bibitem{GriffinTversky} Dale Griffin; Amos Tversky. The Weighing of Evidence; the Determinants of Confidence. \textit{Cognitive Psychology}. vol. 24. pp. 411-435. 1992.
\bibitem{GriffithsTenenbaum} Thomas L. Griffiths; Joshua B. Tenenbaum. Optimal Predictions in Everyday Cognition. \textit{Psychological Science}. vol. 17. no. 9. pp. 767-773. 2006.
\bibitem{HalevyEllsbergRevisited} Yoram Halevy. Ellsberg revisited: an experimental study. \textit{Econometrica}. vol. 75. no. 2. pp. 503-536. 2007.
\bibitem{HalevyFeltkamp} Yoram Halevy; Vincent Feltkamp. A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion. \textit{Review of Economic Studies}. vol. 72. pp. 449-466. 2005.
\bibitem{HastingsWeinstein} Justine Hastings; Jeffrey Weinstein. Information, School Choice; Academic Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments. \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics}. vol. 123. no. 4. pp. 1373-1414. 2008.
\bibitem{HertwigErev} Ralph Hertwig; Ido Erev. The description-experience gap in risky choice. \textit{Cell}. 2009.
\bibitem{hertwigetal} Ralph Hertwig; Greg Barron; Elke U. Weber; Ido Erev. Decision from experience; the effect of rare events in risky choice. \textit{Psychological Science}. vol. 15. pp. 534-539. 2004.
\bibitem{HoelzlRustichini} Erik Hoelzl; Aldo Rustichini. Overconfident: Do You Put Your Money On It?. \textit{Economic Journal}. vol. 115. no. 04. pp. 305-318. 2005.
\bibitem{Hoffman} Mitchell Hoffman. How is Information Valued? {E}vidence from Framed Field Experiments. \textit{unpublished manuscript}. 2014.
\bibitem{HoltLaury} Charles A. Holt; Susan K. Laury. Risk Aversion; Incentive Effects. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 92(5). pp. 1644 - 1655. 2002.
\bibitem{HoltSmith} Charles A. Holt; Angela M. Smith. An Update on Bayesian Updating. \textit{Journal of Economic Behavior; Organization}. vol. 69. pp. 125-134. 2009.
\bibitem{Jessupetal.} Ryan K. Jessup; Anthony J. Bishara; Jerome R. Busemeyer. Feedback Produces Divergence From Prospect Theory in Descriptive Choice. \textit{Psychological Science}. vol. 19. no. 10. pp. 1015-1022. 2008.
\bibitem{KahnemanTversky1979} Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. \textit{Econometrica}. vol. 2. pp. 263-292. 1979.
\bibitem{KahnemanTversky1992} Amos Tversky; Daniel Kahneman. Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. \textit{Journal of Risk; Uncertainty}. vol. 5. no. 4. pp. 297-323. 1992.
\bibitem{KahnemanTverskyRepresentativeness} Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky. Subjective Probability: A Judgement of Representativeness. \textit{Cognitive Psychology}. vol. 3. pp. 430-454. 1972.
\bibitem{Karni} Edi Karni. A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities. \textit{Econometrica}. vol. 77. no. 2. pp. 603-606. 2009.
\bibitem{KarniViero} Edi Karni; Marie-Louise Viero. `Reverse Bayesianism': A choice-based theory of growing awareness. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 103. no. 7. pp. 2790-2810. 2013.
\bibitem{kaustiaknupfer} Markku Kaustia; Samuli Kn{\"u}pfer. Do investors overweight personal experience? Evidence from IPO subscriptions. \textit{Journal of Finance}. vol. 63. pp. 2679-2702. 2008.
\bibitem{KerenWillemsen} Keren, Gideon; Martijn C. Willemsen. Decision Anomalies, Experimenter Assumptions; Participants' Comprehension: {R}evaluating the Uncertainty Effect. \textit{Journal of Behavioral Decision Making}. vol. 22. no. 3. 2008.
\bibitem{Kocheretal.} Kocher, Martin; Michal Krawczyk; Frans van Winden. Let Me Dream on! {A}nticipatory Emotions; Preference for Timing in Lotteries. \textit{Working paper}. 2009.
\bibitem{Koszegi.EgoUtility} Botond Koszegi. Ego Utility, Overconfidence,; Task Choice. \textit{Journal of the European Economic Assiciation}. vol. 4. no. 4. pp. 673-707. 2006.
\bibitem{KoszegiRabin2009} Koszegi, Botond; Matthew Rabin. Reference-Dependent Consumption Plans. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 99. no. 3. pp. 909-936. 2009.
\bibitem{KraemerWeber} Carlo Kraemer; Martin Weber. How Do People Take into Account Weight, Strength; Quality of Segregated vs. Aggregated Data? Experimental Evidence. \textit{The Journal of Risk; Uncertainty}. vol. 92. no. 2. pp. 113-142. 2004.
\bibitem{KT74} Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics; Biases. \textit{Science}. vol. 185. no. 4157. pp. 1124-1131. 1974.
\bibitem{KublerWeizsacker} Dorothea Kubler; Georg Weizsacker. Limited Depth of Reasoning; Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory. \textit{Review of Economic Studies}. vol. 71. 2004.
\bibitem{LOTR} M.F. Scheier; C.S. Carver; M.W. Bridges. Distinguishing Optimism from Neuroticism (and trait anxiety, self-mastery,; self-esteem): A re-evaluation of the Life Orientation Test. \textit{Journal of Personality; Social Psychology}. vol. 67. pp. 1063-1078. 1994.
\bibitem{MalmendierNagel2} Ulrike Malmendier; Stefan Nagel. Learning from Inflation experiences. \textit{mimeo}. 2012.
\bibitem{malmendnagel} Ulrike Malmendier; Stefan Nagel. Depression babies: Do macroeconomic experiences affect risk taking?. \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics}. vol. 126. pp. 373-416. 2011.
\bibitem{MasseyWu} Cade Massey; George Wu. Detecting Regime Shifts: The Causes of Under-; Overreaction. \textit{Management Science}. vol. 51. no. 6. pp. 932-947. 2005.
\bibitem{McKelveyZavoina} Richard D. McKelvey; William Zavoina. A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal level dependent variables. \textit{The Journal of Mathematical Sociology}. vol. 4. no. 1. pp. 103-120. 1975.
\bibitem{MerloSchotter} Antonio Merlo; Andrew Schotter. Learning by no doing: an experimental investigation of observational learning. \textit{Games; Economic Behavior}. vol. 42. pp. 116-136. 2003.
\bibitem{milgrom1982information} Milgrom, Paul; Stokey, Nancy. Information, trade; common knowledge. \textit{Journal of Economic Theory}. Elsevier. vol. 26. no. 1. pp. 17--27. 1982.
\bibitem{millermaniadis} Joshua Miller; Zacharias Maniadis. The weight of personal experience: an experimental Measurement. \textit{IGI institute for economic research working paper}. vol. 452. 2012.
\bibitem{Moebiusetal.} Markus M. Moebius; Muriel Niederle; Paul Niehaus; Tanya S. Rosenblat. Managing Self-Confidence: Theory; Experimental Evidence. \textit{unpublished manuscript}. 2013.
\bibitem{MorrisShin} Stephen Morris; Hyun Song Shin. Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 88. no. 3. pp. 587-597. 1998.
\bibitem{nisbettross} Richard E Nisbett; Lee Ross. Human Inference: Strategies; Shortcomings in Social Judgement. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1980. 1980.
\bibitem{PetersonBeach} Cameron R. Peterson; Lee Roy Beach. Man As An Intuitive Statistician. \textit{Psychological Bulletin}. vol. 68. no. 1. pp. 29-46. 1967.
\bibitem{PetersonSchneiderMiller} Cameron R. Peterson; Robert J. Schneider; Alan J. Miller. Sample Size; the Revision of Subjective Probabilities. \textit{Journal of Experimental Psychology}. vol. 69. no. 5. pp. 522-527. 1965.
\bibitem{PrelecPrelec} Danica Mijovic-Prelec; Drazen Prelec. Self-deception as self-signalling: a model; experimental evidence. \textit{Phil. Trans. R. Soc.}. vol. 365. pp. 227 - 240. 2009.
\bibitem{RabinNBLLN} Daniel J. Benjamin; Matthew Rabin; Collin Raymond. A Model of Non-belief in the Law of Large Numbers. \textit{Oxford Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series}. vol. 672. 2013.
\bibitem{Roth1979} Roth, Alvin E; Malouf, Michael W. Game-theoretic models; the role of information in bargaining.. \textit{Psychological Review}. American Psychological Association. vol. 86. no. 6. pp. 574. 1979.
\bibitem{Rydvaletal.} Rydval, Ondrej; Andreas Ortmann; Sasha Prokosheva; Ralph Hertwig. How Certain is the Uncertainty Effect. \textit{Experimental Economics}. vol. 12. pp. 473-487. 2009.
\bibitem{Savage1954} Leonard J Savage. Foundations of Statistics. Wiley. 1954.
\bibitem{SchlagVanDeWeele} Schlag, Karl; Joel van der Weele. Eliciting Probabilities, Means, Medians, Variances; Covariances without assuming Risk Neutrality. \textit{Technical Report, Universitat Pompeu Fabra}. October 2009.
\bibitem{Schotteretal.} Meta Brown; Christopher J. Flinn; Andrew Schotter. Real-Time Search in the Laboratory; the Market. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 101. no. 2. 2011.
\bibitem{SchweizerSzech} Nikolaus Schweizer; Nora Szech. Optimal Revelation of Life-Changing Information. \textit{mimeo}. 2013.
\bibitem{Segal} Uzi Segal. The Ellsberg Paradox; Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach. \textit{International Economic Review}. vol. 28. pp. 175-202. 1987.
\bibitem{Seo} Kyoungwon Seo. Ambiguity; Second Order Belief. \textit{Econometrica}. vol. 77. no. 5. pp. 1575 - 1605. 2009.
\bibitem{Sharotetal.} Tali Sharot; Christoph W Korn; Raymond J Dolan. How unrealistic optimism is maintained in the face of reality. \textit{Nature Neuroscience}. vol. 14. no. 11. pp. 1475-1481. 2011.
\bibitem{Shiller} Robert J. Shiller. Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. 71. no. 3. pp. 421-436. 1981.
\bibitem{Simonsohn} Uri Simonsohn. Direct Risk Aversion: Evidence from Risky Prospects Valued Below Their Worst Outcome. \textit{Psychological Science}. vol. 20. no. 6. pp. 686-692. 2009.
\bibitem{Simonsohnetal} Uri Simonsohn; Niklas Karlsson; George Loewenstein; Dan Ariely. The tree of experience in the forrest of information: Overeighting experienced relative to observed information. \textit{Games; Economic Behavior}. vol. 62. pp. 263-268. 2008.
\bibitem{StanovichWest} Keith E. Stanovich; Richard F. West. On the Relative Independence of Thinking Biases; Cognitive Ability. \textit{Journal of Personality; Social Psychology}. vol. 94. no. 4. pp. 672-695. 2008.
\bibitem{Sunder} Shyam Sunder. Market for Information: Experimental Evidence. \textit{Econometrica}. vol. 60. no. 3. pp. 667-695. 1992.
\bibitem{SzkupTrevino} Michal Szkup; Isabel Trevino. Costly information acquisition in a speculative attack: Theory; experiments. \textit{mimeo, New York University}. 2013.
\bibitem{ThinkingFastAndSlow} Daniel Kahneman. Thinking Fast; Slow. Macmillan. 2011.
\bibitem{TobacykMilford} Jerome Tobacyk; Gary Milford. Belief in Paranormal Phenomena: Assessment Instrument Development; Implications for Personality Functioning. \textit{Journal of Personality; Social Psychology}. vol. 44. no. 5. pp. 1029-1037. 1983.
\bibitem{TverskyFox} Amos Tversky; Craig R. Fox. Weighting Risk; Uncertainty. \textit{Psychological Review}. vol. 102. pp. 269-283. 1995.
\bibitem{YatesZukowski} Frank Yates; Lisa Zukowski. Characterization of Ambiguity in Decision Making. \textit{Behavioral Science}. vol. 21. pp. 19-25. 1976.
\bibitem{Zimmermann} Florian Zimmermann. Clumped or Piecewise? {E}vidence on Preferences for Information. \textit{Management Science (forthcoming)}. 2014.
\bibitem{ztree} Urs Fischbacher. z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments. \textit{Experimental Economics}. vol. 10. no. 2. pp. 171-178. 2007.
\bibitem{BenabouTirole2002} B{\'e}nabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean. Self-confidence; personal motivation. \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics}. JSTOR. vol. 117. no. 3. pp. 871--915. 2002.
\bibitem{Ambuehletal.Repugnance} Sandro Ambuehl; Muriel Niederle; Alvin E. Roth. More Money, More Problems? {C}an High Pay be Coercive; Repugnant?. \textit{American Economic Review, P\&P}. vol. 105. no. 5. pp. 357-60. 2015.
\bibitem{hanna2014learning} Hanna, Rema; Mullainathan, Sendhil; Schwartzstein, Joshua. Learning Through Noticing: Theory; Experimental Evidence in Farming⇤. 2014.
\bibitem{schwartzstein2014selective} Schwartzstein, Joshua. Selective attention; learning. \textit{Journal of the European Economic Association}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 12. no. 6. pp. 1423--1452. 2014.
\bibitem{bartos2013attention} Bartos, Vojtech; Bauer, Michal; Chytilov{\'a}, Julie; Mat{\v{e}}jka, Filip. Attention discrimination: Theory; field experiments. \textit{American Economic Review}. vol. forthcoming. 2015.
\bibitem{Sichermanetal.} Sicherman, Nachum; Loewenstein, George; Seppi, Duane J; Utkus, Stephen P. Financial attention. \textit{Available at SSRN 2339287}. 2014.
\bibitem{Karlssonetal.} Karlsson, Niklas; Loewenstein, George; Seppi, Duane. The ostrich effect: Selective attention to information. \textit{Journal of Risk; Uncertainty}. Springer. vol. 38. no. 2. pp. 95--115. 2009.
\bibitem{sundaresan2014inattentive} Sundaresan, Savitar; Turban, S{\'e}bastien. Inattentive Valuation; Belief Polarization. 2014.
\bibitem{Wilson} Wilson, Andrea. Bounded memory; biases in information processing. \textit{Econometrica}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 82. no. 6. pp. 2257--2294. 2014.
\bibitem{BabcockLoewenstein2} Babcock, Linda; Loewenstein, George; Wang, Xianghong. The relationship between uncertainty, the contract zone,; efficiency in a bargaining experiment. \textit{Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}. Elsevier. vol. 27. no. 3. pp. 475--485. 1995.
\bibitem{Loewensteinetal.SelfServing} Loewenstein, George; Issacharoff, Samuel; Camerer, Colin; Babcock, Linda. Self-serving assessments of fairness; pretrial bargaining. \textit{The Journal of Legal Studies}. JSTOR. pp. 135--159. 1993.
\bibitem{BabcockLoewenstein3} Babcock, Linda; Loewenstein, George; Issacharoff, Samuel; Camerer, Colin. Biased judgments of fairness in bargaining. \textit{The American Economic Review}. JSTOR. pp. 1337--1343. 1995.
\bibitem{BabcockLoewenstein} Babcock, Linda; Loewenstein, George. Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of self-serving biases. \textit{The Journal of Economic Perspectives}. JSTOR. vol. 11. no. 1. pp. 109--126. 1997.
\bibitem{Yariv} Yariv, Leeat. I'll See It When I Believe It? A Simple Model of Cognitive Consistency. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper. 2002.
\bibitem{RabinSchrag} Rabin, Matthew; Schrag, Joel L. First impressions matter: A model of confirmatory bias. \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics}. JSTOR. pp. 37--82. 1999.
\bibitem{baliga2013polarization} Baliga, Sandeep; Hanany, Eran; Klibanoff, Peter. Polarization; ambiguity. \textit{The American Economic Review}. American Economic Association. vol. 103. no. 7. pp. 3071--3083. 2013.
\bibitem{mcfadden2000rationality} McFadden, Daniel; Machina, Mark J; Baron, Jonathan. Rationality for economists?. In Elicitation of Preferences. Springer. pp. 73--110. 2000.
\bibitem{benjamin2012model} Benjamin, Daniel J; Rabin, Matthew; Raymond, Collin. A Model of Non-belief in the Law of Large Numbers. \textit{Available at SSRN 1945916}. 2012.
\bibitem{armel2008biasing} Armel, K Carrie; Beaumel, Aurelie; Rangel, Antonio. Biasing simple choices by manipulating relative visual attention. \textit{Judgment; Decision Making}. Society for Judgment; Decision Making. vol. 3. no. 5. pp. 396--403. 2008.
\bibitem{krajbich2011multialternative} Krajbich, Ian; Rangel, Antonio. Multialternative drift-diffusion model predicts the relationship between visual fixations; choice in value-based decisions. \textit{Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences}. National Acad Sciences. vol. 108. no. 33. pp. 13852--13857. 2011.
\bibitem{krajbich2010visual} Krajbich, Ian; Armel, Carrie; Rangel, Antonio. Visual fixations; the computation; comparison of value in simple choice. \textit{Nature neuroscience}. Nature Publishing Group. vol. 13. no. 10. pp. 1292--1298. 2010.
\bibitem{RatcliffDDM} Ratcliff, Roger. A theory of memory retrieval.. \textit{Psychological review}. American Psychological Association. vol. 85. no. 2. pp. 59. 1978.
\bibitem{Bogagczetal.} Bogacz, Rafal; Brown, Eric; Moehlis, Jeff; Holmes, Philip; Cohen, Jonathan D. The physics of optimal decision making: a formal analysis of models of performance in two-alternative forced-choice tasks.. \textit{Psychological Review}. American Psychological Association. vol. 113. no. 4. pp. 700--765. 2006.
\bibitem{woodford2014optimizing} Woodford, Michael. An Optimizing Neuroeconomic Model of Discrete Choice. \textit{National Bureau of Economic Research}. vol. 19897. 2014.
\bibitem{woodford2014stochastic} Woodford, Michael. Stochastic choice: An optimizing neuroeconomic model. \textit{The American Economic Review}. American Economic Association. vol. 104. no. 5. pp. 495--500. 2014.
\bibitem{woodford2012inattentive} Woodford, Michael. Inattentive valuation; reference-dependent choice. \textit{Unpublished manuscript}. 2012.
\bibitem{woodford2012prospect} Woodford, Michael. Prospect theory as efficient perceptual distortion. \textit{The American Economic Review}. American Economic Association. vol. 102. no. 3. pp. 41--46. 2012.
\bibitem{YangInfoAcquisition} Yang, Ming. Coordination with flexible information acquisition. \textit{Journal of Economic Theory}. Elsevier. vol. 158. no. B. pp. 721--738. 2014.
\bibitem{MartinJMP} Martin, Daniel. Strategic pricing; rational inattention to quality. \textit{unpublished manuscript}. 2014.
\bibitem{CaplinMartin} Caplin, Andrew; Martin, Daniel. A testable theory of imperfect perception. \textit{The Economic Journal}. Wiley Online Library. vol. 125. no. 582. pp. 184---202. 2014.
\bibitem{CaplinDeanPosteriorBased} Caplin, Andrew; Dean, Mark. Rational Inattention, Entropy,; Choice: The Posterior-Based Approach. \textit{unpublished manuscript, New York University}. 2013.
\bibitem{CaplinDean.StateDependentStochasticChoice} Caplin, Andrew; Dean, Mark. Rational inattention; state dependent stochastic choice. \textit{unpublished manuscript, New York University}. 2013.
\bibitem{CRT2} Toplak, Maggie E; West, Richard F; Stanovich, Keith E. Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test. \textit{Thinking \& Reasoning}. Taylor \& Francis. vol. 20. no. 2. pp. 147--168. 2014.
\bibitem{Slowiaczeketal.} Slowiaczek, Louisa M; Klayman, Joshua; Sherman, Steven J; Skov, Richard B. Information selection; use in hypothesis testing: What is a good question,; what is a good answer?. \textit{Memory \& Cognition}. Springer. vol. 20. no. 4. pp. 392--405. 1992.
\bibitem{rusconi2013insensitivity} Rusconi, Patrice; McKenzie, Craig RM. Insensitivity; oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity in hypothesis testing. \textit{The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology}. Taylor \& Francis. vol. 66. no. 12. pp. 2443--2464. 2013.
\bibitem{NickersonReview} Nickerson, Raymond S. Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises.. \textit{Review of general psychology}. Educational Publishing Foundation. vol. 2. no. 2. pp. 175. 1998.
\bibitem{McKenzieInsensitivity} McKenzie, Craig RM. Increased sensitivity to differentially diagnostic answers using familiar materials: Implications for confirmation bias. \textit{Memory \& Cognition}. Springer. vol. 34. no. 3. pp. 577--588. 2006.
\bibitem{KuhnenKnutson} Kuhnen, Camelia M; Knutson, Brian. The influence of affect on beliefs, preferences,; financial decisions. \textit{Journal of Financial; Quantitative Analysis}. Cambridge Univ Press. vol. 46. no. 03. pp. 605--626. 2011.
\bibitem{KlaymanReview} Klayman, Joshua. Varieties of confirmation bias. \textit{Psychology of learning; motivation}. Elsevier. vol. 32. pp. 385--418. 1995.
\bibitem{Sims2006} Sims, Christopher A. Rational inattention: Beyond the linear-quadratic case. \textit{American Economic Review, Papers \& Proceedings}. JSTOR. vol. 96. no. 2. pp. 158--163. 2006.
\bibitem{MatejkaMcKayAERPP} Mat{\v{e}}jka, Filip; McKay, Alisdair. Simple market equilibria with rationally inattentive consumers. \textit{The American Economic Review}. American Economic Association. vol. 102. no. 3. pp. 24--29. 2012.
\end{thebibliography}


\end{document}
