# Social Preferences over Ordinal Outcomes

Authors: Sandro Ambuehl; B. Douglas Bernheim
Venue: American Economic Review, 2026, 116(5): 1648-1681
Year: 2026
Source: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20211491
PDF: https://sandroambuehl.com/assets/papers/social-preferences-ordinal-outcomes.pdf
Plain text version: https://sandroambuehl.com/assets/plain-text/social-preferences-ordinal-outcomes.tex
LaTeX source bundle: https://sandroambuehl.com/assets/plain-text/social-preferences-ordinal-outcomes.tex
Replication package: https://doi.org/10.3886/E226921V1

## Abstract

Collective decision making requires preference aggregation even if no ideal aggregation method exists. We investigate how individuals think groups should aggregate members' ordinal preferences: that is, how they interpret the will of the people. Our experiment elicits revealed attitudes toward ordinal preference aggregation and classifies subjects according to the rules they implicitly deploy. Majoritarianism is rare while rules that promote compromise are common.
People evaluate relative sacrifice by inferring cardinal utility from ordinal ranks. Cluster analysis reveals that our classification encompasses all important aggregation rules. Aggregation methods exhibit stability across domains and across countries with divergent traditions.

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